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Brentano’s Revaluation of the Scholastic Concept of Intentionality 
into a Root-Concept of Descriptive Psychology 1 
CYRIL MCDONNELL 
Abstract It is generally acknowledged that it is principally due to Brentano and his 
students, in particular Husserl, that the medieval-scholastic terminology of ‘intentional 
act’ and ‘intentional object’ re-gained widespread currency in philosophical circles in 
the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. This paper examines Brentano’s 
original re-introduction and revaluation of the Scholastic concept of intentionality into 
a root-concept of descriptive psychology. It concentrates on (1) Brentano’s 
modification of the Scholastic concept of object-relatedness of the will to depict the 
object-relatedness of all psychical-act experiences in consciousness, (2) Brentano’s 
modification of the Scholastic concept of the abstracted form of sense residing 
intentionally in the soul of the knower to depict the directly intended object of 
consciousness, and (3) the significance of these modifications for understanding what 
commentators now call ‘Brentano’s thesis’. It notes that Brentano develops not one 
but two descriptive-psychological theses of intentionality both of which are entirely 
unScholastic. It also notes, however, that part of the original meaning of the 
metaphysical distinction that the Scholastics drew between ‘intentional indwelling’ 
(inesse intentionale) and ‘real being’ (esse naturale) continues to play a critical role in 
Brentano’s revision of the concept of intentionality in Psychology from an Empirical 
Standpoint (1874) and in his lecture courses delivered at Vienna University on Descriptive 
Psychology (1887-91), and that this part of the original meaning of the Scholastic 
concept of intentionality remains both alive and intact in Brentano’s 1874 study and in 
Husserl’s (in)famous transcendental reduction of Ideas I (1913). Thus the paper argues 
that identifying what Brentano accepts, rejects, and adds to the original Scholastic 
concepts of ‘intentional act’ and ‘the intentional indwelling of an object’ cannot be 
evaded in the proper elucidation and evaluation of ‘Brentano’s thesis’. 
Introduction 
Throughout his career in philosophy, Husserl reiterated the point that he 
began his philosophical path of thinking in phenomenology and 
phenomenological research in the aftermath of Brentano’s re- 
introduction of the Scholastic concept of intentionality, and his 
1 This is a revised and extended version of a paper delivered at the Irish Philosophical 
Society’s Autumn Conference on ‘Perspectives on Medieval and Scholastic Philosophy’, 
held in collaboration with the School of Politics, International Studies and Philosophy, 
Queen’s University Belfast, in November 2005. I would like to thank both the 
participants of that conference for their questions, and the referee whose request for 
clarification on some points in my initial draft has helped greatly.
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transformation of it into a root-concept of descriptive psychology. 2 
Indeed, Husserl went as far as to maintain in 1931 that ‘his [Brentano’s] 
conversion (Umwertung) of the scholastic concept of intentionality into a 
descriptive root-concept of psychology constitutes a great discovery, apart 
from which phenomenology could not have come into being at all’. 3 In 
this paper, I wish to concentrate attention on Brentano’s revaluation 
(Umwertung) of the Scholastic concept of intentionality that occurred in his 
elaboration of the concept of the intentionality of consciousness in his 
lectures on ‘Descriptive Psychology’, given at Vienna University in the 
late 1880s and early 1890s, 4 and, prior to that, in his initial and famous re- 
2 Cf. Edmund Husserl, Phänomenologische Psychologie, Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925, 
Gesammelte Werke, Husserliana (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1968), Vol. IX, ed. by Walter 
Biemel, ‘§ 3 d Brentano als Wegbereiter für die Forschung in innerer Erfahrung – 
Enkdeckung der Intentionalität als Grundcharakter des Psychischen’, pp. 31–5; 
Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester 1925, trans. by John Scanlon (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), ‘Section (d) Brentano as pioneer for research in 
internal experience—discovery of intentionality as the fundamental character of the 
psychic’, pp. 23–7. Cf., also, Husserl’s tribute to Brentano, ‘Erinnerungen an Franz 
Brentano’, in Oskar Kraus, Franz Brentano. Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehre, 
Appendix II, (Munich, 1919); ‘Reminiscences of Franz Brentano’, trans. by Linda L. 
McAlister, in The Philosophy of Brentano, ed. by Linda L. McAlister (London: 
Duckworth, 1976), pp. 47–55, p. 50 
3 Edmund Husserl, ‘Author’s Preface to the English Edition’ of Ideas: General 
Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. by W.R. Boyce Gibson (London: Unwin & 
Allen, 1931), pp. 5–22, in particular pp. 16–17; Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und 
phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch, Allgemeine Einführung in die reine 
Phänomenologie, (Halle: Niemeyer, 1913); Hua Vol. III/ 1 & III/ 2 ed. by Karl 
Schumann (1977, 1995) 
4 Cf., Franz Brentano, Descriptive Psychology, trans. and ed. by Benito Müller (London: 
Routledge, 1995), Deskriptive Psychologie, ed. by Roderick M. Chisholm & Wilhelm 
Baumgartner (Hamburg: Meiner, 1982). The first time that Brentano delivered a 
lecture-course entitled ‘Descriptive Psychology’ was in 1887/88, and he repeated 
these, without major revision, in 1888/89 and 1890/91. Thus Husserl, who had 
attended Brentano’s lectures in Vienna University from 1884/6, would not have 
attended these lectures. Müller informs us, however, that ‘[E]ven though Husserl left 
Vienna by the time the present lectures were read by Brentano, he was in possession 
of a transcript (by Dr Hans Schmidkunz) of the 1887/8 lectures which is kept in the 
Husserl Archive in Leuven, (call number Q10).’ (Introduction, Part I, Descriptive 
Psychology, p. xiii, n. 14.) Dermot Moran also notes that after Husserl left Vienna in 
1886 he still ‘diligently collected Brentano’s lecture transcripts, e.g. his Descriptive 
Psychology lectures of 1887–91, his investigations of the senses, as well as his studies of 
fantasy, memory and judgement’. See Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2005), pp. 18–19. In ‘Reminiscences of Franz Brentano’, Husserl 
tells us that Brentano’s ‘thinking never stood still’ (p. 50), and that the way in which 
Brentano attempted to clarify the origin of the meaning of concepts employed in the 
normative sciences of Logic, Ethics, and Aesthetics, through the application of his
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introduction of ‘what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the 
intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object’ in his 1874 unfinished 
study Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (PES). 5 It seems to me that 
unless we can reasonably determine both what Brentano actually 
subscribes to in the Scholastic concept and what changes he implements 
to that concept, the full meaning that Brentano attributes to this root- 
concept of descriptive psychology will be either not fully understood or 
not properly evaluated. 6 This paper will not address, however, the 
descriptive-psychological method of inquiry, was the most enduring memory he held 
of these lectures; indeed, ‘it was from his [these] lectures that I first acquired the 
conviction that gave me the courage to choose philosophy as my life’s work’ (p. 47– 
8). For a lucid account of the impact of the descriptive method that Brentano was 
developing in these lectures on Husserl’s initiation and formation in philosophy, see 
Theodore De Boer’s excellent, short article ‘The Descriptive Method of Franz 
Brentano: Its Two Functions and Their Significance for Phenomenology’, in The 
Philosophy of Brentano, ed. by Linda L. McAlister, pp. 101–7. 
5 Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, trans. by Antos. C. Rancurello, 
D.B. Terrell & Linda L. McAlister (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973; 
Routledge, 1995), p. 88; Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (Leipzig: Duncker and 
Humblot, 1874) 
6 For a defence of the Scholastic credentials of Brentano’s account of intentionality in 
PES, see Ausiono Marras, ‘Scholastic Roots of Brentano’s Conceptions of 
Intentionality’, in The Philosophy of Brentano, ed. by Linda L. McAlister, pp. 128–39. 
What Marras successfully defends in his paper, however, is the Scholastic account, and 
not Brentano’s account. Thus, the major conceptual discrepancies between the 
Scholastic account and Brentano’s ‘new’ thesis of intentionality are neither noted nor 
addressed in his paper. A similar absence is present in a more recent article, written by 
Dale Jacquette, ‘Brentano’s Concept of Intentionality’, in The Cambridge Guide to 
Brentano, ed. by Dale Jacquette (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) pp. 
98–130. Jacquette seems to approve of Marras’ treatment of Brentano’s thesis (cf. p. 
125, n. 5) thus the actual modification of the scholastic meaning of intentionality does 
not feature in his paper either. For an examination of the historical origins of the 
meanings of various versions of the Scholastic concept of intentionality that 
Brentano’s terminological use of the term in PES (1874) points back to, in particular 
to late medieval Scholasticism, see Klaus Hedwig’s ‘Intention: Outlines for a History 
of a Phenomenological Concept’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 39 (1979) 
pp. 326–40. In PES, however, it is quite clear that Brentano deviates considerably 
from the meanings of the Scholastic concept noted by Hedwig (cf., esp., pp. 328–30). 
Given that ‘there is no evidence’, as Hedwig points out, ‘that Husserl himself studied 
the Greek and scholastic sources from which the concept of intention derived’ (p. 333), 
we can see why Husserl is correct in his own self-evaluation to maintain that he begins 
philosophizing in the aftermath of  the descriptive-psychological modification of the Scholastic 
concept of intentionality by Brentano. Cf., also, Klaus Hedwig, ‘Der scholastische Kontext 
des Intentionalen bei Brentano’, in Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos, eds R. M. Chisholm 
and R. Haller, (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1978) pp. 67–82, and P. Englehardt ‘Intentio’, 
Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 4 (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 
Darmstadt, 1976), pp. 466–74
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controversial issue of Husserl’s advancement of Brentano’s concept of 
intentionality because this would require a major study in itself, and 
Theodore de Boer has already accomplished this in his masterful work 
The Development of Husserl’s Thought. 7 Nor will this paper deal with the many 
disagreements that still exist among commentators and critics concerning 
the interpretation, meaning and validity of the various versions of 
‘Brentano’s thesis’, that were elaborated after Brentano. 8 Rather, the focus 
of this paper is on the general features of the two scholastic concepts of 
intentional act and intentional object that Brentano modified and that are 
most relevant both to the understanding and to the evaluation of 
Brentano’s new descriptive-psychological concept of the intentionality of 
7 Theodore De Boer, The Development of Husserl’s Thought, trans. by Theodore Plantinga 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978); Die ontwikkelingsgang in het denken van Husserl 
(Assen: Van Gorcum, 1966). See also Klaus Hedwig, ‘La discussion sur l’origine de 
l’intentionalité husserlienne’, Les Etudes Philosophiques (1978) pp. 259–72. Brentano, of 
course, thought that Husserl’s descriptive-eidetic psychology had not advanced his idea 
of descriptive psychology, and that Husserl had wrongly accused him of 
psychologism. Cf. Brentano, PES, ‘Appendix (1911), Supplementary Remarks, IX ‘On 
Genuine and Fictitious Objects’, pp. 291–301; XI ‘On Psychologism’, pp. 306–7. This 
philosophical dispute between Brentano and Husserl is still on-going among 
commentators today. Cf. Robin D. Rollinger, ‘Brentano and Husserl’ in The Cambridge 
Guide to Brentano, pp. 255–76 
8 A complicating factor in this entire matter, no doubt, is the fact that several of 
Brentano’s students and followers, whilst advocating critical allegiance to Brentano’s 
original concept, promoted different versions of ‘Brentano’s thesis’, and these 
versions themselves often came into direct conflict not only with Brentano’s doctrine 
but also with each other. Cf. Dermot Moran, ‘The Inaugural Address: Brentano’s 
Thesis’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary vol. LXX (1996), pp. 1–27. 
This commentator believes that Brentano’s more immediate students (Twardowski 
and Husserl are named together) interpret ‘Brentano’s thesis’ more faithfully than later 
analytic commentators who follow R.M. Chisholm’s ‘influential account’ (ibid. p. 2) 
unfurled in the 1960s. Philip J. Bartok, however, has recently argued that both analytic 
and phenomenological approaches do not do entire justice to ‘Brentano’s thesis’ in 
that ‘each reads Brentano in terms of philosophical concerns and standards that were 
not his own’. ‘Brentano’s Intentionality Thesis: Beyond the Analytic and 
Phenomenological Readings’, Journal of History of Philosophy, vol. 43, no. 4 (2005) pp. 
437–60, p. 439. It is of importance in evaluating ‘Brentano’s Thesis’, therefore, to be 
sure about whose thesis and which thesis of intentionality that is the target of either 
interpretive elucidation or critical evaluation. Bartok tries to steer a course back to 
‘Brentano’s thesis’ itself, which means for this author navigating ‘a route between the 
excesses of these two “analytic” and “phenomenological” influential readings of 
Brentano’s thesis’ (p. 439). Bartok does not return to the Scholastic terminology used 
by Brentano, however, nor does he address the modifications that Brentano actually 
introduces to the meaning of the Scholastic concept of intentionality in the 
elaboration of descriptive psychology. Thus, ‘Brentano’s Intentionality Thesis’ is not 
completely read on its own terms, though this is the intention (cf. p. 439 and no. 8).
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consciousness. Even within these limitations, the matter is one of 
immense complexity. 
Brentano’s Revaluation of the Scholastic Concept of Intentional Act into a Root- 
Concept of Descriptive Psychology 
Towards the beginning of his course of lectures on Descriptive 
Psychology (DP), which Brentano first delivered at Vienna University in 
1887 and repeated, without major revision, in 1888 and 1890, Brentano 
remarks to his students, 
[T]he peculiarity which, above all, is generally characteristic of [human] 
consciousness, is that it shows always and everywhere, i.e. in each of its 
separable parts, a certain kind of relation, relating a subject to an object. This 
relation is also referred to as ‘intentional relation’ (intentionale Beziehung). To 
every consciousness belongs essentially a relation. … The one correlate is the 
act of consciousness; the other is that which it is directed upon (DP, p. 23). 
Elaborating further on what he exactly means by this, Brentano lists the 
following examples for his students: ‘seeing and what is seen. Presenting 
and what is presented. Wanting and what is wanted. Loving and what is 
loved. Denying and what is denied etc.’ (DP, p. 24). Brentano, however, 
claims no originality in spotting this ‘intentional relation’ in 
consciousness. In fact, Brentano claims that Aristotle was the first to 
recognise this, and also says: ‘[A]s highlighted already by Aristotle, the 
correlates display the peculiarity that the one alone [the act of 
consciousness] is real, whereas the other [the object of consciousness] is 
not something real (nichts Reales)’ (DP, p. 24). 9 
9 Brentano does not tell his students where exactly he found this in Aristotle. In the 
‘Editors’ Notes’, Baumgartner and Chisholm remark that here, ‘Brentano is evidently 
referring to Metaphysics, 1021 a, 30’ (DP, 180, n.9). This is in keeping with Brentano’s 
own similar citation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book V, Chapter 15, 1021a 29, in his The 
Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, trans. by Roderick M. Chisholm & E. 
Schnerwind (London and New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), p.14, n.19; Vom 
Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis (Leipzig, Duncker and Humblot, 1889). There are, 
however, major conceptual differences between Aristotle’s account of this ‘relation’ in 
Metaphysics, Book V, Chapter 15 and Brentano’s account in DP and in The Origin of our 
Knowledge of Right and Wrong. We thus have to look outside of the passage that 
Brentano actually alludes to in order to follow Brentano’s line of reasoning. This 
explains, nevertheless, why commentators cannot find and have not found any direct 
clues in the actual passage itself from Aristotle’s Metaphysics, or in similar passages from 
Aristotle’s De Anima which Brentano also alludes to (cf. PES, 88–89, n.), for helping 
them to unravel Brentano’s understanding of the ‘intentional relation’ that he claims exists 
between acts of consciousness and their objects.
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In a public lecture before the Vienna Law Society which Brentano 
also delivered around this time, on 23 January 1889, entitled ‘The Origin 
of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong’, and which he later published in 
the same year as part of his work in ‘descriptive psychology’, 10 Brentano 
re-iterates this same point about our consciousness, maintaining, 
The common feature of everything psychological often referred to, 
unfortunately, by the misleading term ‘consciousness’ (Bewußtsein), consists in a 
relation that we bear to an object. The relation has been called intentional; it is a 
relation to something which may not be actual but which is presented as an 
object. There is no hearing unless something is heard, no believing unless 
something is believed; there is no hoping unless something is hoped for, no 
striving unless there is something that is striven for; one cannot be pleased 
unless there is something that one is pleased about; and so on, for all the other 
psychological phenomena. 11 
Brentano’s main concern about the understanding and possible 
misunderstanding of the nature of our consciousness itself, therefore, 
would appear to be this: that if we do not start from the outset by taking 
the term ‘consciousness’ (Bewußtsein) as denoting the existential fact that 
consciousness is always a consciousness of something, then we will be 
misled by the term into thinking that consciousness, in its actuality, is 
something other than that, that is to say, that one’s own actual 
consciousness is something that has no intrinsic bearing on the objects of 
which consciousness is a consciousness. 12 What this thesis of 
10 Cf. Brentano ‘Foreword’ to The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, pp. ix–x 
11 Brentano, The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, p. 14 
12 Brentano had already made this exact same point earlier in PES, but nowhere in 
PES does Brentano actually describe this relation between the acts of consciousness and 
its objects as an intentional relation. Rather, there we read: ‘(I)n the first place … the 
term “consciousness,” since it refers to an object which consciousness is conscious of 
(‘von welchem das Bewuβtsein Bewuβtsein ist’), [it] seems to be appropriate to characterise 
psychical phenomena precisely in terms of its distinguishing characteristic, i.e., the 
property of the intentional in-existence of an object’ (p. 102). The ‘intentional in- 
existence of an object’ in consciousness is a different concept of intentionality to the 
‘intentional relation’ of the acts of consciousness towards its objects, alluded to in DP 
and in his 1889 lecture. The former concept is one that Brentano himself tells us he 
retrieved from Scholastic epistemology, PES, p. 88, and we will deal with it in more 
detail in the following section. The concept of ‘intentional relation’, which Brentano 
would also lead us to believe he retrieves from Scholastic theory of knowledge, is in 
fact an extension of  the Scholastic theory of  the object-relatedness of the acts of the 
will. A complicating matter in addressing Brentano’s adaptation of the Scholastic 
concept of intentionality into a root concept of descriptive psychology, therefore, is
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intentionality stresses, therefore, is the relatedness of our ‘acts of 
consciousness’ or ‘psychical phenomena’ or ‘psychological phenomena’— 
terms which Brentano takes to be all synonymous expressions, whatever 
about the reservations he may have about using the misleading term of 
‘consciousness’(Bewußtsein)—to their objects, whatever the latter may be. 13 
Regarding his use of the term ‘intentional’ in his description of the 
relation of conscious acts to their objects in his 1889 lecture, Brentano 
later added a written note to the published text, remarking that ‘[T]he 
expression ‘intentional’, like many other of our more important concepts, 
comes from the Scholastics’. 14 
Brentano, then, would like both the students attending his lectures 
on ‘Descriptive Psychology’ and the reader of his 1889 lecture to believe 
that Aristotle and the medieval Aristotelian Scholastics held a similar, if 
not an identical thesis to his own about the existence of an intentional 
the fact that he adapts the meanings of two different concepts of ‘intentio’ that are 
found in Scholastic thought, one concerning the intentional act of the will and another 
concerning the abstracted form of sense (or intelligible species) residing intentionally in 
the soul of the knower. H. D. Simonin, who has carried out an extensive and 
meticulous examination of both of these concepts in the writings of St Thomas, 
demonstrates that St Thomas never confuses the two different meanings of the one 
and same term (‘un seul et même terme’) of intentio, when the latter is employed in 
either the cognitive or conative order. Cf. Simonin, ‘La Notion d’intentio dans l’oeuvre 
de S. Thomas d’Aquin’, Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques, 19 (1930), pp. 445– 
63, p. 451. Brentano, however, modifies the meaning of both of these Scholastic 
concepts in the elaboration of descriptive psychology. Furthermore, these concepts of 
‘intentional act’ and ‘intentional object’ become conceptually correlative concepts in 
Brentano’s descriptive psychology, something which is impossible for St Thomas, but 
which is not only possible but actually the case in all of Husserl’s writings, for 
example. 
13 For Brentano, therefore, our consciousness cannot be (reducible to) a particular 
feeling (of happiness or unhappiness) or a mood but contains a structural unity of its 
own, that is to say, a ‘real unity’ of multiplicity, PES, p. 165. And because there is a 
‘real’, ‘natural unity’ of ‘acts’ and ‘objects’ in consciousness, a descriptive science of 
these phenomena is possible. Thus Brentano’s account of the ‘unity of consciousness’ 
in PES Book II, Chapter IV ‘On the Unity of Consciousness’, pp. 155–76, is of 
pivotal significance to his project of a descriptive science of psychical phenomena in 
general. Thinkers as diverse as William James and Husserl, despite their different 
views from Brentano’s on this matter, agreed with Brentano that ‘this tenet [of the 
unity of consciousness] has been misunderstood by both its supporters and its 
opponents’ (PES, p. 163, my emphasis) in modern scientific psychology. 
14 Brentano, The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, p. 14, n.19. As a source 
reference for this reference (and for the Scholastics), Brentano cites Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, Book V, Chapter 15, 1021a 29, as in the ‘Editors’ Note’ in DP above.  See 
n. 8 above, however.
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relation or a directedness that resides in all of our acts of consciousness 
towards their objects. 
The Scholastics, however, did not (and could not) hold the view 
that all of ‘our conscious acts’ or ‘everything psychological’—even if we 
grant Brentano his un-Aristotelian and post-Cartesian modern elision of 
the concept of ‘everything psychological’ with ‘our acts of consciousness’ 
or ‘the mental’—bear an intentional relation to their objects in the way 
Brentano suggests. The Scholastics did not regard acts of sensation, for 
example, as bearing any such intentional relation to their objects. Neither 
did they regard acts of cognition per se as intentional acts. Rather, the 
Scholastics, strictly speaking, regarded only those acts over which I have 
at least some degree of control in bringing about and which I execute 
with at least some degree of foresight as intentional acts, i.e., as acts that 
‘consist in a relation that we bear to an object’. In this regard, the 
opposite of an intentional act for the Scholastics would be an act 
performed by an agent that had unintended outcomes, or an act that is 
related to an outcome which can have no relation at all to the agent’s 
actual intention, such as, for instance, an act of sensation experienced 
when hitting one’s shin in tripping over a stool, or an act of wishing (velle) 
‘that the weather be good tomorrow’. 15 Part of the very meaning and 
15 This is Brentano’s own example, taken from 1907. The example in full reads: ‘But 
wanting, willing, and desiring do not thus abstract from circumstances; they involve 
preference that takes into account whatever I happen to be aware of at that particular 
moment. It should be noted that I can thus want or desire a particular thing without at 
all believing it to be something I can bring about myself. I can want that the weather 
be good tomorrow, but I have no choice in that matter.’ ‘Loving and Hating’ (Dictation, 
May 19, 1907), Appendix IX in The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, p. 151. 
Having no choice in that matter—i.e. in weather conditions—would suffice to rule out 
such wants as intentional acts of the will for St Thomas and the Medieval Scholastics. 
Cf. Simonin, ‘La Notion d’intentio’, p. 452. This example, taken after 1905 when 
Brentano had relinquished his 1874 PES views on consciousness containing 
immanent, intentional objects, illustrates well, nevertheless, the difference between the 
way the Scholastics regarded intentional acts and the way Brentano, from a 
descriptive-psychological point of view, regards intentional acts of consciousness. 
Brentano, however, appears to be entirely oblivious of his own deviation from the 
Scholastic concept of the ‘intentional relation’ that is characteristic of the activity of 
human acts of the will, in his actual use and understanding of the concept of ‘the 
intentional’ in his 1889 lecture and 1907 note on ‘Loving and Hating’. This explains, 
somewhat, Edmund Runggaldier’s remarks, that ‘[I]t is well known that Brentano 
distanced himself in the course of time [by 1905] from the doctrine of intentional 
inexistence without, however, discarding the doctrine of intentionality [‘as 
directedness toward an object’]’ ‘On the Scholastic or Aristotelian Roots of 
“Intentionality” in Brentano’, Topoi, vol. 8, no.2 (1989), pp. 97–103, p. 98. This does 
not justify this commentator’s conclusion, however, that ‘[I]ntentionality in this
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understanding of an intentional act for the Scholastics, then, is that the 
end in view (intentio finis) is executable by the agent. 16 The intended goal 
(finis intentus) is thus an integral part of the ‘intentional activity (in-tentio)’ 
itself. 17 In this context, to say that ‘I have an intention in mind’ simply 
means for St Thomas that ‘I intend to do something’, or indeed that ‘I 
intend to refrain from doing something’. 18 Whether we manage to reach 
our objectives, or are thwarted for whatever reason in reaching those 
objectives, the intention to do so, nevertheless, still exists. 19 The origin of 
the meaning of this concept of ‘intentio’ or ‘intentional activity’ for the 
Scholastics, therefore, does not so much come from the sound of the 
term itself ‘in-tentio’, as St Thomas says, ‘Intentio, sicut ipsum nomen sonat, 
modern sense [qua ‘Brentano’s intentionality as directedness toward something other’] 
is also rooted in the classical Aristotelian and Thomistic works’ (p. 102), if this is 
taken, as it is by this author (similarly to Marras), as pointing to the Medieval- 
Aristotelian account of sense knowledge as knowledge of ‘physical’ or ‘corporeal’ (p. 
102) things in the world, gained via abstraction by the powers of the active intellect, a 
theory that Brentano did hold in his 1866 Psychology of Aristotle but rejects in PES. 
16 ‘Le mot [‘intentio’ in Latin] lui-même signifie tendre vers un but: ‘in aliud tendere’ 
…parmi les facultés de l’âme, le role moteur est assuré par la volonté; l’action de 
tender, intentio, est donc, en termes propres, le fait de la volonté’ (Simonin, ‘La Notion 
d’intentio’, p. 452). The term ‘intentio’ or ‘intention’ also occurs in Scholastic theory of 
cognition. Here, however, it has an entirely different meaning to the one that it enjoys 
in Scholastic theory of volition. Simonin’s conclusion about the main difference in 
the meaning of the same term, pending on whether it is being used in the conative or 
cognitive order in the writings of St Thomas, is, that ‘[C]omme acte d’une tendance, la 
notion s’applique d’abord et proprement aux seules puissances de l’appétit, elle 
désigne une impulsion motrice, un influx causal. Au contraire, dans l’ordre de la 
connaissance, la notion d’intentio perd complètement son sens moteur, elle convient à 
l’object possédé par l’esprit dont elle désigne le mode d’être special’ (p. 461, my emphasis). 
17 Thus we find the following expressions among the Scholastics depicting this 
concept of intention in terms of: ‘intentio finis, finis intentus, id quod agens intendit.’ 
(Simonin, ‘La Notion d’intentio’ p. 447). 
18 This is not to say that both images and the power of imaging (phantasia) play a 
pivotal role in the planning of any action for Aristotle and the Aristotelians. 
Nevertheless, the crucial point in this Scholastic theory of the ‘intentio (intentional 
activity)’ of the will is that the immanent intention of any particular act of the will is 
fulfilled when the action is completed. It is only in the completion of the intended 
outcome of an action that the intention itself, therefore, is fully revealed for what it is, 
and so, it is only in the completion of the action that the intention as such can be 
properly inferred and knowable either by me or by others, however difficult that 
might be, and however difficult that might be capable of being proven or disproven in 
a court of law, as the audience of the Vienna Law Society attending Brentano’s 1889 
lecture would have well known. 
19 This is an important concept that comes from the Scholastics, and it is the same 
concept of ‘intent’ that Brentano’s audience of his 1889 lecture would have heard, 
discussed and disputed in courts of law.
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significat in aliud tendere’, 20 though it does this also, as much as it comes 
directly from our experience and understanding of acts of the human 
will. 21 
It is of course true that the Scholastics did not deny the analogical 
predication of such ‘intentio (intentional activity)’ to the activity of beings 
other than human e.g. the ‘striving’ of plants towards the light of the sun, 
the ‘decision’ of birds to migrate to sunnier climates in winter, or the 
‘building’ of honeycombs and webs by bees and spiders respectively. 22 In 
all of these cases, such intentional activity (intentio) clearly touches upon 
the question of ‘final causality’ for the Scholastics, and indeed it is derived 
from it. 23 Spiders and bees, however, do not really make decisions to 
build webs or honeycombs. Nor does a plant consciously strive towards 
the heat emanating from the sun. Rather, these expressions must be 
20 Summa Theologiae, I–II, 12, 1c., quoted by Marras, ‘Scholastic Roots of Brentano’s 
Conceptions of Intentionality’, p. 135, n. 26. What Marras does not point out to the 
reader (and appears to be unaware of) is that St Thomas supplies this etymological 
elucidation of the term ‘intentio’ in a question that is devoted to the human will, and 
not in an account of cognition as Marras intimates. 
21 In the discussion of ‘Brentano’s thesis’, much has been made of where the 
Scholastic Latin term of ‘intentio’ is derived. Many commentators draw attention to the 
Latin rendering of Al-Farabi and Avicenna’s Arabic term ma’na (‘a meaning’, ‘essential 
content’, ‘idea’, ‘concept’, ‘essence’), following Herbert Spiegelberg’s remarks in his 
well-known ‘Intention and Intentionality in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl’, 
originally published in 1933/34 in German as ‘Der Begriff der Intentionalität in der 
Scholastik, bei Brentano und bei Husserl’, and revised without major changes in 1969, 
and translated into English in 1976 as ‘Intention and Intentionality in the Scholastics, 
Brentano and Husserl’ by Linda L. McAlister, in McAlister ed. The Philosophy of 
Brentano, pp. 108–27. Cf. P. Engelhardt ‘Intentio’, Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, 
pp. 466–74; K. Hedwig’s ‘Intention: Outlines for a History of a Phenomenological 
Concept’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 39 (1979) pp. 326–40, esp. pp. 
328–30; E. Runggaldier, ‘On the Scholastic or Aristotelian Roots of ‘Intentionality’ in 
Brentano’, Topoi, (1989), pp. 97–102, p. 100; R. Sorabji, ‘From Aristotle to Brentano: 
The Development of the Concept of Intentionality’, in Oxford Studies in Ancient 
Philosophy, ed. Julia Annas (1991), Supplementary Volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition, 
ed. by H. Blumenthal and H. Robinson, pp. 227–259, pp. 236–37; P. Simons, 
‘Introduction to the Second Edition’, PES (London/New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 
xiii–xxii, p. xix; D. Moran, An Introduction to Phenomenology (London: Routledge, 2000), 
p. 47; p. 482, n.80. All of these remarks, however, mainly concern the Latin translation 
of the notion of ‘intentio’ when deployed in the cognitive order, and not the notion of 
‘intentio’ when deployed in the conative order. 
22 Cf. Simonin, ‘La Notion d’intentio’ pp. 453–4 
23 This, however, must be understood in an analogous sense to the way the intentional 
activity of the human will expresses itself.  Cf. Simonin, ‘La Notion d’intentio’ p. 454. 
Cf., also, Herbert Granger, ‘Aristotle on the Analogy between Action and Nature’, The 
Classical Quarterly, vol. 43, no.1 (1993), pp. 168–76
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interpreted in their proper context, that is to say, in the thoroughly 
teleological understanding of nature that characterises medieval-Scholastic 
thought in general, and living organisms in particular. 24 In other words, it 
is for the good (bonum) of the plant in its natural being (esse naturale) that it 
‘strives’ both metaphysically and automatically (but ‘unknowingly’ and 
‘unwillingly’) towards the sun in order to receive the warmth of its light. It 
is otherwise concerning what a human being may or may not be inclined 
to set out to achieve because not everything that that being consciously 
strives to realise for that being’s own good does realise that being’s own 
good (either morally or metaphysically). Human beings, as morally free 
beings, cannot be capable of acting morally and automatically for their 
own good all the time. Human beings, as a matter of fact, make mistakes 
in this department, but such mistakes cannot be put down to a fault in 
nature. Nevertheless, it is still the case for St Thomas that it is only in 
those acts of the will that are chosen and undertaken by a free rational 
being that ‘intentio (intentional activity)’ is regarded as intentional activity 
‘principaliter et proprie’, for, it is only in those acts that the ‘intentio’ or 
intentional activity contain within itself its own causal efficacy, i.e., its self- 
directedness. 25 This is why St Thomas concludes that ‘intentio’ or 
intentional activity is a property of the acts of our will: ‘intentio est proprie actus 
voluntatis.’ 26 
When the Scholastics employed the term ‘intentional’ to describe 
the ‘relation we bear to an object’, therefore, it depicts the particular kind 
of self-directedness that characterizes the immanent striving of the 
activity of the will of a doer of an action towards its objectives and the 
outcome of that action. 27 The Scholastics, however, did not regard all of 
24 Cf. James McEvoy, ‘Finis est causa causarum: le primat de la cause finale chez S. 
Thomas’, in Finalité et intentionnalité: doctrine thomiste et perspectives modernes, ed. J. Follon et 
J. McEvoy, Éditions de l’institut supérieur de philosophie (Bibliothèque philosophique 
de Louvain, no. 36), Paris/Leuven 1992, pp. 93–111.  Cf., also, James McEvoy, ‘The 
Teleological Perspective Upon Nature’, in Finalité et intentionnalité: doctrine thomiste et 
perspectives modernes, pp. 1–8 
25 Simonin, ‘La Notion d’intentio’ p. 453 
26 Ibid., p. 452 
27 Thus Brentano’s footnote reference in The Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong 
(p. 14, n. 19) to Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book V, Chapter 15, 1021a 29 as the place 
where his account of ‘intentional relation’ can be found is somewhat misleading 
because ‘intentional relation’, in the way Brentano understands it, is not discussed there at 
all—or, at most, very differently to Aristotle’s views. It is thus understandable why 
commentators, who take Brentano at his own word in the 1889 footnote, or 
previously in PES (p. 88), and even after his so-called crisis of immanence of 1905 
and his development of a doctrine of ‘reism’, find it somewhat incomprehensible to 
square Brentano’s descriptive-psychological views on the intentionality of consciousness
Brentano and Intentionality 135 
Yearbook of The Irish Philosophical Society 2006 
our ‘acts of consciousness’ or all of our ‘psychological phenomena’, as 
Brentano calls them, as possessing this property. The Scholastics did not 
regard our acts of cognition, for example, as intentional acts per se, though 
they did emphasise the point that acts of cognition generally unfold on 
the basis of a co-operation between the will and the intellect of the 
individual knower to engage in such acts precisely because the will 
(voluntas) will be involved in anything a human being wants (velle) to do, 
and this includes wanting to know something. The Scholastics, however, 
did not deny the existence of involuntary acts of knowledge. We could 
end up knowing something that we either did not want to know or did 
not set out to know, after all. In Scholasticism, therefore, acts of 
cognition are not strictly comparable to intentional acts of the will. 
Rather, in Scholastic theory of knowledge, intelligibility is elicited from 
data presented by the knower through the exercise of the agent intellect. 
The outcome of this process results in a modification of the knower’s 
potential to become an actual knower of that-which-is-knowable. Before, 
during, and after this process, both knower and that which is potentially 
intelligible retain their specific natures and their respective ontological 
integrities. The immanent ‘striving’ or ‘impulse after’ achieving its own 
ends or goals (tendere in aliud) that is characteristic of the dynamic of the 
will, therefore, is not found in acts of the intellect. What is found in acts of 
the intellect instead, is the abstractive ability of its operations to discover 
(in-venire) the truth of its knowledge-claims about whatever it is that is 
under consideration, even if it turns out to be the case, on closer 
examination as St Augustine acutely noted, that both in the process of the 
discovery of that truth and in the discovery of the truth itself a certain 
amount of psychological happiness (gaudium de veritate) is also registered, as 
a matter of (lived) fact, in the soul of the human being. 28 
For the Scholastics, then, acts of cognition are not by nature 
intentional acts. Nor did the Scholastics regard acts of sensation as 
intentional acts either. Such acts occur without the will or the intelligence 
of a human being. When a human being touches ‘physical things’ in the 
‘external world’, the potencies of the sensitive soul (anima sensitiva) of that 
living being are activated, resulting in acts of sensation for that individual 
being. 29 This encounter between ‘physical things in the external world’ 
with any Aristotelian realist account. Cf. Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology, ‘The 
intentional relation’, pp. 47–52 
28 Cf. Joseph McBride, Albert Camus (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1992), esp. Chapter 
3, pp. 25–40 
29 Franz Brentano, The Psychology of Aristotle, in Particular His Doctrine of the Active Intellect, 
trans. by Ralph George (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California
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and ‘the embodied sensitive soul of the human being’ demonstrates for 
Aristotle and the Aristotelians the corporeal nature of the sensitive soul 
(in the human being)—a view that Brentano defends with admirable 
clarity in his 1866 Habilitation thesis on The Psychology of Aristotle, in 
Particular His Doctrine of the Active Intellect. Furthermore, because acts of 
sense knowledge are founded upon actual acts of sensation of physical things 
existing in the external world this explains why the modern problematic of 
bridging the gap between consciousness and the external world does not 
arise for Aristotle or for the Aristotelians (or appear in Brentano’s 1866 
study of Aristotle’s psychology). 30 
Brentano’s expressed view in the late 1880s and early 1890s that all 
of our psychical-act experiences—acts of sensation, cognition and volition 
etc.—bear an immanent intentional relation to their respective objects, 
therefore, deviates considerably from the way in which the Scholastics 
both used and confined the meaning of the term ‘intentional’ to designate 
the object-relatedness that is characteristic of acts of the will, and only 
acts of the will. In fact, Brentano’s expansion of the application of the 
term ‘intentional’ to include all psychical-act experiences that are 
discernible within human consciousness ‘led’, as John Passmore remarks, 
‘to his being grouped with the followers of Schopenhauer as a “hormic” 
psychologist, for whom “objects” are purposes, or ends, and “acts” are 
the impulses which strive towards those ends’. 31 Brentano, however, 
clearly means no such thing; rather, Brentano’s view is quite a 
straightforward view, but it does require that we confine our attention to 
the way in which psychical-act experiences (in consciousness) present 
themselves as acts that are specifically directed towards their objects. In 
other words, Brentano presents his ‘thesis’ on the directedness of the acts 
of consciousness towards their immediate objects as a strictly intuitive 
item of knowledge that is discoverable about consciousness itself from 
Press, 1977) p. 17; Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom nous poiētikos. 
(Mainz: Kirchheim, 1867) 
30 An act of sensation, therefore, is not ipso facto an act of sense knowledge for 
Aristotle and the Aristotelians, though the latter act is dependent on the existence and 
co-operation of the former. Nevertheless, the Scholastic-Aristotelian position, as 
succinctly summed by Brentano, is thus: ‘Whatever is in the intellect is also in sense, 
though the relation [between acts of sensation and acts of knowledge and their 
respective objects] is not the same in the two cases’ (The Psychology of Aristotle, p. 88, my 
emphasis). Brentano deviates completely for this view in his 1874 PES and in his 
lectures on DP. 
31 John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy (London: Duckworth, 1957; Penguin 
Books, 1968; 1980), p. 178
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within reflection upon the nature of conscious acts themselves. 32 In this 
32 This is what Brentano really means by ‘inner perception’ i.e. inner reflection. 
Depending on the context, however, ‘inner perception’ can mean at least one of four 
things for Brentano, namely: (1) ‘incidental awareness’ (Bewusstsein nebenbei), i.e. the 
awareness of being aware which forms an integral part of a conscious act. This facet 
of a conscious act is ‘an accessory feature included in the act itself’ PES, p. 141. 
Brentano retrieved this doctrine entirely from Aristotle. Cf. Brentano’s direct 
quotation of Aristotle’s, Metaphysics, Book XII, 9: ‘Knowledge, sensation, opinion and 
reflection seem always to relate to something else, but only incidentally to themselves’ 
PES, p. 132. This doctrine is central to Brentano’s understanding of the ‘unity of 
consciousness’ PES, ch. IV, a point re-iterated by him in his lectures on DP: ‘The fact 
which was already asserted by Aristotle … that there is no consciousness without any 
intentional relation at all is as certain as the fact that, apart from the object upon 
which it is primarily directed, consciousness has, on the side (nebenher, incidentally), 
itself as an object’ DP, p. 26. This incidental awareness is ‘part of the nature of every 
psychical act’ (ibid.). Incidental awareness, however, is not a self-sufficient act but 
parasitic on a conscious act. Cf., De Boer, The Development of Husserl’s Thought, p. 36. 
Husserl acknowledges both the importance and the validity of this doctrine but 
because ‘incidental awareness’ is not an attentive act it can play no methodological role in 
the elaboration of the scientific description of acts and their objects in descriptive psychology 
(this has confused those commentators who think it does). Incidental awareness, 
therefore, does not feature in Husserl’s elaboration of his mentor’s idea of a new 
science of descriptive psychology. Cf., Husserl, ‘Appendix: External and Internal 
Perception: Physical and Psychical Phenomena’, Logical Investigations, ed. D. Moran 
(London/New York: Routledge, 2001) pp. 852–69. Inner perception can mean for 
Brentano (2) the Lockean hypothesis of an inner accompanying act of perception 
supervening on all conscious acts, hence, all psychical-act experiences are 
automatically being perceived, and so, accordingly called ‘phenomena’. Thus, for 
Brentano, there is no such thing as an unconscious perception or any other kind of 
unconscious psychical-act experience as it actually occurs. PES, pp. 102–3. Husserl 
rejects this doctrine, finding no evidence of an inner additional perceptual act of 
consciousness supervening on one’s actual experience but admits that all psychical-act 
experiences are in principle ‘ready to be perceived’ if they become objects of inner 
reflection (see (4) below). Inner perception can also mean for Brentano (3) the 
perception of the existence of a currently lived psychical-act experience (and its 
intentional object, if it exists): ‘In the case of cognition through inner perception, what 
we perceive is that a psychical act exists’ PES, p. 141. This is a doctrine which Husserl 
develops as ‘immanent perception’ in Ideas, which is apodictic, albeit limited strictly to 
the present, and it plays a pivotal role in his transcendental reduction. Finally, inner 
perception means most importantly for Brentano, from a methodological point of 
view, (4) the natural ability of consciousness to reflect upon its own content PES, p. 
30; pp. 276–7. This designates both a philosophical stance and a methodological 
approach to the study of consciousness that Brentano takes from Descartes, Locke, 
and Hume, and one that Husserl follows methodologically (and approvingly) in his entire 
path of thinking about consciousness, cf., Ideas, § 77 ‘The Phenomenological Study of 
Reflections on Mental Processes’ (Erlebnisreflexionen). Even if Brentano confusedly 
uses the term ‘inner perception’ to denote all of the above four different things, this 
does not excuse commentators confusing the different meanings of that term as
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regard, Brentano has clearly aligned his thinking methodologically to the 
tradition of modern ‘psycho-analytic’ inquiry instigated by Descartes, and 
advanced by Locke and Hume, where knowledge of consciousness is to 
be wrought from within immediate reflection on consciousness itself. In 
doing this, Brentano has also, and unequivocally, relinquished his 
previously held Aristotelian approach to psychology. Instead, we now 
hear Brentano both insisting and (re)assuring his audience of his 1889 
lecture that: ‘Inner perception tells me that I am now having such-and- 
such sound or colour sensations, or that I am now thinking or willing this 
or that.’ 33 In fact, Brentano had already adopted this ‘modern conception’ 
of psychology some fifteen years earlier, in his 1874 publication of PES, 
for, in response to Hume—but not against Hume—Brentano had already 
conceded that in matters of psychological inquiry ‘[W]hether or not there 
are souls, the fact is there are psychical [mental] phenomena’(PES, p. 18). 
The starting point for Brentano’s new science of descriptive 
psychology, therefore, is the particular experiencing of consciousness of a 
‘mentally active subject’, where the approach to the study of that 
consciousness has been philosophically pre-determined in line with the 
tradition of modern psychological inquiry proposed by Descartes, Locke 
and Hume. The facticity of one’s own actual consciousness and its 
contents, i.e., ‘immediate experiential facts’ (Erfahrungstatsachen) (DP, p. 
139), now becomes for Brentano that behind which we cannot step, 
methodologically speaking, as far as Brentano’s new science of descriptive 
employed by Brentano, though it certainly does make it more difficult for 
commentators to know which meaning or meanings of the term Brentano is actually 
using in a particular context. Once the various meanings of this term are 
acknowledged, however, Brentano’s concept of ‘inner perception’ is not as incoherent, 
incomprehensible, or esoteric as critics sometimes portray it. 
33 Brentano, On the Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, pp. 19–20. In PES, 
Brentano had already adopted this ‘modern definition’ (PES, p. 18) of ‘psychology as 
a science’, maintaining that ‘Psychology, like all natural sciences, has its basis in 
perception (Wahrnehmung) and experience (Erfahrung). Above all, however, its source is 
to be found in the inner perception of our own psychical phenomena (der eigenen 
psychischen Phänomene). We would never know what a thought is, or a judgement, 
pleasure or pain, desires or aversions, hopes or fears, courage or despair, decisions and 
voluntary intentions if we did not learn what they are through inner perception of our 
own phenomena.  Note, … we said that inner perception (innere Wahrnehmung) and not 
introspection, i.e. inner observation (innere Beobachtung), constitutes this primary (erste) 
and indispensable source (unentbehrliche Quelle) of psychology.’ PES, Book I, 
Psychology as a Science, Chapter 2 ‘Psychological Method with Special Reference to 
its Experiential Basis’ (‘Über die Methode der Psychologie, insbesondere die 
Erfahrung, welche für sie die Grundlage bildet’), § 2., p. 29; pp. 40–1, trans. modified.
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psychology is concerned. 34 This means that for the descriptive 
psychologist (or ‘psychognost’) 35 the intentionality of consciousness is an 
item of knowledge that is only visible and verifiable from within the 
methodological parameters of inner reflection on the nature of conscious 
acts themselves. In other words, ‘descriptive psychology’, unlike its 
component discipline which Brentano calls ‘genetic psychology’ (and 
which corresponds to the natural-scientific manner of investigation in 
empirical psychology), seeks direct, non-hypothetical, intuitively 
demonstrable knowledge-claims about our consciousness as such. 36 
‘Another important difference’ that Brentano notes between the 
kind of knowledge-claims that are sought in ‘descriptive psychology’ in 
comparison to the kind generated in ‘genetic psychology’ is that 
34 That this basis becomes dispensable in Husserl’s elaboration of the intuition of 
essences in the Logical Investigations (1900–01), therefore, was incomprehensible to 
Brentano. See, however, Bartok, Brentano’s Intentionality Thesis, p. 442. 
35 Brentano coined the term ‘Psychognosie’ for the descriptive part of the science of 
empirical psychology and the term ‘psychognost’ for the descriptive psychologist.  He 
borrowed the idea of dividing the science of empirical psychology into two 
component parts, a descriptive and a genetic part, from a model that occurred in other 
natural sciences. ‘In the same way as orognosy and geognosy precede geology in the 
field of mineralogy, and anatomy generally precedes physiology in the more closely 
related field of the human organism, psychognosy [descriptive psychology] … must be 
positioned prior to genetic psychology’ DP, p. 8. The main aim of the descriptive 
science is to describe clearly what the genetic, natural-scientific part would later 
attempt to explain causally using the method of observation, hypotheses and 
experimental technique. Cf. Brentano’s letter to Oskar Kraus in 1894, published in the 
Appendix of PES, pp. 369–70. How descriptive-psychological truths that are by 
nature non-hypothetical, intuitively demonstrable and a priori knowledge-claims about 
consciousness itself are exactly related to or complemented by natural-scientific 
knowledge-claims that are hypothetically demonstrable, empirically verifiable and 
truths that are probably true of the physical world about us, including ourselves as 
hypothesized ‘things’ in and of that world, does not feature as problematic in 
Brentano’s thought. This problematic relation between philosophy as descriptive 
psychology and the natural sciences, however, did occupy Husserl’s attention greatly 
in the development of his thought. Cf. De Boer, The Development of Husserl’s Thought. 
36 In PES Brentano believed that just as physics had established itself as ‘the science of 
pure physical phenomena’, so too psychology could become the natural science of 
‘psychical phenomena in general’ (pp. 98–100). It is only after PES that Brentano 
realised the autonomous nature of the ‘descriptive part’ of psychology, independently 
of all natural-scientific manner of inquiry [= ‘metaphysical hypotheses’, PES, p. 64], as 
he had elaborated it. Herbert Spiegelberg concludes that because Brentano’s very idea 
of descriptive psychology entails ‘a peculiar intuitive examination of the phenomena 
[of consciousness]’, right from its inception it ‘establishes itself as an autonomous 
enterprise, if not as a separate one’ from all other established natural sciences, such as, 
for instance, ‘psychophysics and physiological psychology’. The Phenomenological 
Movement: A Historical Introduction (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1994), p. 35
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descriptive psychology ‘is an exact science, and that in contrast, genetic 
psychology, in all its determinations, in an inexact one’ (DP, p. 4–5). By 
an exact science, Brentano means those ‘sciences which can formulate 
their doctrines sharply and precisely’, such as, for instance, ‘a 
mathematician doesn’t say: the sum of the angles of a triangle is often, or 
usually, equal to two right angles. But he says that this is always and 
without exception the case’ (DP, p. 5). Descriptive psychology seeks this 
latter kind of precision and accuracy in its knowledge-claims. By 
comparison, all natural-scientific investigations, including genetic 
psychology, seek knowledge-claims that are true for the most part but not 
necessarily true, and so, the ‘stimulation of a retinal part [of the eye] by a 
light-ray of a certain frequency [which] induces the phenomenon of blue’ 
does ‘not always’ induce the phenomenon of blue ‘as it is not true in case 
of (a) colour-blindness, (b) interruption of the conductor, severance of 
the nerve, (c) losing in competition (Besiegtwerden im Wettstreit), (d) 
replacement by a hallucination’ (DP, pp. 6–7). 
Brentano’s division of the sciences into exact and inexact sciences 
reflects, by and large, the epistemological division that famously occurs in 
‘Hume’s fork’ concerning knowledge-claims pertaining to ‘matters of fact’ 
and ‘relation of ideas’, and before Hume, to Leibniz’s distinction between 
‘truths of fact’ and ‘truths of reason’. 37 Descriptive psychology, 
nevertheless, seeks ‘vérités de raison’, that is to say, items of knowledge that 
are eternally true. Descriptive psychology, therefore, does not seek 
empirical generalisations the truth of which could always be otherwise. In 
this respect, it is worthwhile to mention in passing that Brentano never 
employed the method of the natural sciences in his actual (descriptive- 
psychological) philosophizing and never proposed the method of the 
natural sciences for his new science of descriptive psychology. 38 Nor did 
Brentano engage in any historical-hermeneutic analysis of the meaning of 
our lived experiences (Erlebnisse) in the radical and comprehensive manner 
advocated by Dilthey, in what Dilthey also termed around this time 
‘descriptive psychology’. 39 In contrast to this, Brentano employed a more 
37 Cf. Oskar Kraus, ‘Introduction to the 1924 Edition [of PES]’ ‘Appendix’ to PES, 
pp. 396–408, p. 370 
38 One of the theses that Brentano publicly defended in his disputationes at Würzburg 
University in 1866, and that commentators remark, was the well-known thesis: ‘The 
true method of philosophy is none other than that of the natural sciences.’ 
Descriptive psychology clearly employs no such method, however. Cf. de Boer, ‘The 
Descriptive Method of Franz Brentano: Its Two Functions and Their Significance for 
Phenomenology’, p. 106 
39 Identity in terms, however, is not equivalent to identity in concepts. Dilthey 
develops an entirely different concept of ‘Descriptive Psychology’ to that advanced by
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mathematical model of reasoning in his descriptive method because the 
task for the descriptive psychologist is to pick out those essential features 
that are intuitively demonstrable in all psychical-act experiences and their 
immanent objects that cannot, in an a priori manner of speaking, be known 
to be otherwise. According to Brentano, the object-relatedness of all 
conscious acts, the ‘intentionality of consciousness’, is just one such 
discernible structure that is evidently true of the nature of psychical-act 
experiences themselves. Like all descriptive-psychological items of 
knowledge, this item of knowledge, the object-relatedness of all psychical- 
act experiences, expresses for Brentano, then, a ‘truth of reason’, and so it is 
grasped ‘at one stroke and without induction.’ 40 
Because all psychical-act experiences that occur within 
consciousness bear an intuitively demonstrable structural relation (a 
directedness) to their objects, Brentano believes that he is justified in 
borrowing the term ‘intentional’ from the Scholastic theory of the object- 
relatedness of acts of the will to depict the ‘relation we bear [in 
consciousness] to an object’—though Brentano thinks he is borrowing the 
term ‘intentional’ from an aspect connected to the object-relatedness of 
acts of cognition which he claims to have found in Scholastic 
epistemology, and which we will discuss in the following section—as a 
way of describing the activity of consciousness itself. This is why 
Brentano is not deviating in any significant sense either from the meaning 
or from his use of this well-known Scholastic term ‘intentional relation’ to 
describe the directedness of psychical-act experiences towards their objects, 
or the referential characteristic, or the ‘aboutness’ of consciousness, as it 
is sometimes called today. What this tenet of the intentional relation 
(intentionale Beziehung) of the acts consciousness to their objects amounts 
to philosophically, in terms of either realism or idealism, still figures, 
however, in the dispute about both the proper interpretation and the 
correct evaluation of ‘Brentano’s thesis’. For the remainder of this 
section, how Brentano understands this ‘thesis’ will be our only concern. 
Brentano (and Husserl). Cf. Wilhelm Dilthey, Descriptive Psychology and Historical 
Understanding, trans. by Richard M. Zaner & Kenneth L. Heiges, (The Hague: Nijhoff, 
1977); containing ‘Ideas Concerning a Descriptive Psychology and Analytic 
Psychology (1894)’, originally ‘Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde 
Psychologie’, Gesammelte Schriften, Band V. (Leipzig und Bern: Teubner, 1924), pp. 
139–240. See also ‘The Understanding of Other Persons and their Expressions of Life 
(ca. 1910)’, ‘Das Verstehen anderer Personen und ihrer Lebensäusserungen’, 
Gemsammelte Schriften, Band VII (Leipzig und Berlin: Teubner, 1927), pp. 205–27. 
40 Cf. O. Kraus, ‘Introduction to the 1924 Edition [of PES]’, in ‘Appendix’ to PES, 
pp. 396–408, p. 370
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The first and perhaps the most obvious point about Brentano’s 
revaluation of the scholastic concept of the object-relatedness of 
intentional acts of the will to depict the object-relatedness of all conscious 
acts is that this is a thesis about consciousness itself. This is why the 
arrow of the intentionality of consciousness, as Brentano understands it 
in his 1889 lecture and in DP, does not extend outside of consciousness 
but remains within consciousness (and its activity). 41 In other words, for 
Brentano, access to consciousness, as it was for Descartes, Locke and 
Hume before him, is ‘peculiarly direct and certain as compared with our 
knowledge of anything else’. 42 If this is a correct understanding of the way 
Brentano understands his own ‘thesis’, how can we understand Brentano 
remarks in his 1889 lecture that the intentional relation of consciousness 
to its object ‘is a relation to something which may not be actual (wirklich) 43 
but which is presented as an object’? This claim assumes that 
consciousness is directed towards objects that, at least some of the time, 
are actual. And if we take such actual objects to be real objects existing 
outside of consciousness as such, then is not a realist ‘development’ of 
Brentano’s thesis, at least in principle, possible, if not entirely justifiable? 44 
On the other hand, if this thesis is maintaining that it does not matter 
whether the actual object of consciousness is a real object existing outside 
of intentional consciousness or a merely mental object knowingly 
41 Moran notes that ‘G.E.M. Anscombe, ‘The Intentionality of Sensation: A 
Grammatical Feature’, in R. J. Butler, ed., Analytical Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1968), p. 160, traces the medieval meaning of intentio to intendere arcum in, ‘to aim an 
arrow at’ (‘The Inaugural Address: Brentano’s Thesis’, p. 5, n. 9). The activity of 
aiming an arrow towards some object—which it might always miss, of course, only to 
hit something else unintentionally—however, does not convey the intrinsic and 
immanent self-directedness of the object-relatedness that is characteristic of the 
activity of the will towards its objects that seems to underpin Brentano’s revaluation 
and understanding of the Scholastic concept of ‘intentio’ in his descriptive- 
psychological investigations into the nature of the acts of presentation upon which 
consciousness is founded. The metaphor of the ‘arrow’, however, is used quite a lot 
by commentators both in the discussions and in the evaluations of ‘Brentano’s thesis’. 
42 Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, p. 178.  Cf., also, PES, p. 91 
43 From now on, when I use the word ‘actual’, it is as a translation of the German 
adjective wirklich(es/en), as used by Brentano. This in order to avoid the awkwardness 
caused by trying to represent the grammatical agreement found in the German 
language  in an English language article, where such grammatical agreement is simply 
not a feature of the language. 
44 This, in effect, is what Kazimierz Twardowski proposes in his Zur Lehre vom Inhalt 
und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Eine psychologische Untersuchung (Vienna: Alfred Hölder, 
1894).  Translated into English as Kasimir Twardowski, On the Content and Object of 
Presentations. A Psychological Investigation, trans. Reinhardt Grossman (The Hague: 
Nijhoff, 1977).
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intended by the intentional act itself, then is not a so-called 
‘philosophically neutral’ defence with regard to either realism or idealism 
of Brentano’s thesis, at least in principle, possible, if not also entirely 
justifiable? This issue concerning what the actual objects of intentional 
consciousness are has generated much dispute, and it has given rise to 
‘realist’, ‘idealist’, and so-called ‘neutral’ interpretations of ‘Brentano’s 
thesis of intentionality’, interpretations that were to haunt Husserl’s 
development of that thesis likewise. 45 Setting all such interpretations of 
‘Brentano’s thesis’ aside for the moment, we know, however, what 
Brentano is not saying in his thesis. He is not saying that that which 
consciousness is a consciousness of is a ‘real object’ existing as it actually 
does outside of consciousness and independently of any connection to 
our actual consciousness. 46 ‘Inner perception tells me that I am now 
45 Cf. Moran, An Introduction to Phenomenology, ‘Realism and Idealism in the Logical 
Investigations’, pp. 121–3 
46 According to one recent commentator: ‘Brentano held a model of the intentional 
relation, which may be illustrated as follows: psychic act – intentionally relates to – 
immanent objectivity (may or may not be real thing).’ (Moran, An Introduction to 
Phenomenology, p. 57). Unless the ‘real thing’ is a ‘psychical-act experience’, this model 
would misconstrue Brentano’s view, however. From about 1874 to 1905, Brentano 
did believe that ‘real things’ existed outside of consciousness but such things are 
precisely not the directly intended objects of consciousness, and so, outside of the 
domain of descriptive psychology. Rather, they belong to the field of the natural 
sciences. ‘We have seen what kind of knowledge the natural scientist is able to attain. 
The phenomena of light, sound, heat … are not things which really and truly exist. 
They are signs of something real [which the natural scientist studies], which, through 
its causal activity, produces presentations of them, of phenomenal colours, sounds etc. 
in our experiences. We can say that there exists something which, under certain 
conditions, causes this or that sensation. … But this is as far as we can go. We have 
no [direct] experience of that which truly exists, in and of itself [= outside of actual 
experience and hypothetically explained objects of natural science]’ PES, p. 19. Thus 
the natural scientist begins with phenomena (e.g. colours, sounds, etc.) in order to 
show how they really and truly exist (as light rays, sine waves, etc.). Twardowski, 
however, as Moran notes, believes that the real objects of outer sense perception are 
real things in the world, and that these objects are also directly intended in addition to 
the intentional object (content) possessed by the mind (cf., ibid., pp. 56–7). Hence the 
plural ‘presentations (Vorstellungen)’ in the title of his 1894 book Zur Lehre vom Inhalt 
und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Brentano, however, does not subscribe to two directly 
intended objects. Husserl, also, was sharply critical of Twardowski on this duplication 
of intentions, and maintained Brentano’s line that only one intended object of any given 
psychical-act experience is intended, notwithstanding the many ways in which the act 
intends it. For Brentano, then, as Rollinger notes, ‘[W]hen we see colours and hear 
sounds, we accept the objects in question as belonging to the external world, but 
Brentano follows the line of modern philosophy which will not allow for this 
acceptance as evident or even true [because natural science has demonstrated it as 
patently misleading, as a matter of fact, in Brentano’s eyes]. This is not to say,
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having such-and-such sound or colour sensations, or that I am now 
thinking or willing this or that.’ 47 This, however, still does not tell us what 
the actual objects of intentional consciousness are to which Brentano’s 
thesis clearly refers. To understand Brentano’s remarks here in his 1889 
lecture, it is necessary to digress somewhat, and to follow de Boer’s 
advice in noting three things that Brentano distinguishes in PES, namely: 
(1) the psychical, (2) the physical phenomenon, and (3) the physical object 
of natural science. 48 
In PES, the immediate objects of outer sense perception, what 
Brentano calls ‘physical phenomena’, are sensorially perceivable qualities 
e.g. a sound I hear, a colour I see, an odour I smell etc. (PES, pp. 79–80; 
p. 100; pp. 175–176). From a descriptive-psychological point of view on 
actual consciousness, a sound is part of the act of hearing but the sound 
does not have—or, at least cannot be directly known to have—any actual 
existence independently of the act of hearing. Similarly, a colour is part of 
the act of seeing but the colour as such does not have any actual existence 
independently of the act of seeing, and so forth for all such physical 
phenomena. This is why ‘similar images which appear in the imagination’ 
are no less ‘physical phenomena’ in the way Brentano understands this 
term (PES, ibid.). 49 Independently of the act of hearing and the act of 
seeing, however, Brentano believes that these ‘physical phenomena’ 
(sounds and colours) do have ‘real and actual existence’ but not as real 
colours and real sounds; rather, they exist as light rays (or light particles) 
and ‘vibrations of ether’ (sine waves) i.e. as the theoretically constructed 
object of physics, which are precisely not the directly experienced objects of outer 
perceptual-sense experience as such. Brentano, alas, calls these theoretically 
constructed objects of natural science ‘physical phenomena’ too (PES, p. 
99) 50 —and this ambiguity of two completely different meanings for the 
however, that Brentano denies the existence of the external world. As it turns out, he 
regards it as a legitimate [metaphysical] hypothesis in natural science. The vibrations 
of air [viz Brentano’s natural scientific explanation] and the waves of light that exist 
quasi-spatially and quasi temporally, however, are not the [phenomenal] sounds and colours 
which appear in time and space.’ (‘Brentano and Husserl’, p. 260, my emphasis). 
47 Brentano, On the Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, pp. 19–20 
48 Cf. de Boer, The Development of Husserl’s Thought. 
49 ‘It is true that in dreams we have presentations of colours and sounds and various 
other forms, that we are afraid, get angry, feel pleased and experience other emotions. 
But that which these mental activities refer to as their content and which really does 
not appear to be external is, in actuality, no more outside of us than in us. It is mere 
appearance, just as the physical phenomena which appear to us in waking life really 
correspond to no reality although people often assume the opposite’. PES, pp. 175–6 
50 ‘I believe that I will not be mistaken if I assume that the definition of natural science 
as the science of physical phenomena is frequently connected with the concept of
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one term has lead to confusion for commentators. It is of importance to 
distinguish the two meanings of ‘physical phenomena’ that Brentano 
subscribes to in PES, nevertheless. Colours, sounds, and so forth— 
physical phenomena in sense (1) —when considered from a strictly 
descriptive-psychological point of view enjoy phenomenal existence, that 
is to say, they exist as part of actual acts of outer perceptual-sense 
experience, they exist as the objects of those experiences, but they exist 
only as long as the experience occurs. On the other hand, light-rays, sine- 
waves and so forth—physical phenomena in sense (2) —when considered 
from a natural-scientific-theoretical point of view enjoy actual existence, 
whether we are made aware of their actual existence as such through 
natural-scientific means, or not. The latter, however, are not the actual 
objects of outer perceptual-sense experience for Brentano. So, what are 
the actual objects that he claims intentional consciousness is a 
consciousness of? 
Focusing on the ability of consciousness to reflect upon itself and 
to have itself as a ‘content of reflection’ (to borrow a phrase from 
Husserl) Brentano believes that in such reflection, psychical-act 
experiences are perceived exactly as they are in themselves. That is to say, 
these psychical-act experiences have actual existence. And because such 
psychical-act experiences are perceived as such (in inner reflection) they have 
phenomenal existence as well. 51 It is in comparison to these psychical-act 
experiences that have both actual and phenomenal existence that ‘physical 
phenomena’ (in sense (1) , e.g., colours, sounds) are declared by Brentano to 
be objects that have ‘purely’ or ‘only phenomenal existence’ (PES, p. 100, 
my emphasis) and merely mind-dependent existence. Since the objects of 
outer perceptual-sense experience do not enjoy actual existence 
independently of the actual psychical-act experience that presents them 
but, nonetheless, are evidently identifiable as the objects of those actual 
acts of outer perceptual-sense experience, and since psychical-act 
forces belonging to a world which is similar to the one extended in space and flowing 
in time; forces which, through their influence on the sense organs, arouse sensation 
and mutually influence each other in their action, and of which natural science 
investigates the laws of co-existence and succession. If those objects are considered as 
the objects of natural sciences, there is also the advantage [over ‘physical phenomena’ 
considered as sensorial objects of actual acts of outer sense perception, as is evident 
from the context] that this science appears to have as its object something that really 
and truly exists’. PES, pp. 99–100 
51 ‘In the strict sense of the term [Wahrnehmung], they [psychical phenomena] alone are 
perceived.  On this basis we proceeded to define them as the only phenomena [in 
comparison to physical phenomena] which possess actual existence in addition to 
intentional [mental] existence’ PES, p. 97–8, author’s emphasis.
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experiences themselves, in their actuality, are evidently perceived 
(perceivable, for Husserl) in inner perception, it now follows for 
Brentano that the intentional relation within consciousness ‘is a relation to 
something which may not be actual but which is presented as an object’. 52 
The relation between inner perception and ‘its objects’, whether the latter 
are actual psychical-act experiences (psychical phenomena) or the 
immediate (merely phenomenal) objects of outer perceptual-sense 
experience (physical phenomena, colours, sounds etc), therefore, is entirely 
intra-psychical. 53 ‘Inner perception’, as Brentano stresses, ‘tells me [from 
a descriptive-psychological point of view] that I am now having such-and- 
such sound or colour sensations, or that I am now thinking or willing this 
or that’—no more, no less. 
Such a view of intentionality in ‘Brentano’s thesis’, then, clearly 
does not mark any realist-epistemological ‘turn towards the object’, of 
Scholastic ancestry or of any other kind. Nor is it underpinned by any 
voluntarist account of the human mind. Neither does it depict the ability 
of consciousness to bestow meaning on its intended object, such as the 
theory of sense-giving (Sinngebung) elaborated by Husserl in his theory of 
constitution. Nor does it depict any ‘intentional stance’ I adopt towards 
the world, as developed by Dennett. Rather, it is a descriptive- 
psychological thesis about the nature of the acts themselves. That is to 
say, for Brentano, the object-relatedness or directedness towards objects 
in consciousness—the ‘intentional relation’ in consciousness between its 
52 From a strict descriptive-psychological point of view, then, the only things that 
really and truly exist as they are and as they are perceived in consciousness are one’s 
own actual psychical-act experiences, all of them intentionally related to their objects. 
‘[The] correlates [of the intentional relation] display the peculiarity that the one alone 
is real, [whereas] the other is not something real (nichts Reales). A person who is being 
thought (ein gedachter Mensch) is as little something real as a person who has ceased to 
be.’ DP, p. 24.  Commenting on this passage, Bartok thinks that this is an ‘intrusion of 
… metaphysical theorizing [on Brentano’s part] into the middle of a descriptive 
psychological analysis’, even though Bartok admits that these are ‘metaphysical issues 
raised by his descriptive psychological studies’ ‘Brentano’s Intentionality Thesis’ p. 452, n.48, 
my emphasis. 
53 For one commentator, ‘Brentano’s reliance on the additional consciousness account 
… concerning the unity of the act and the nature of its object’, which commits 
Brentano to the view that ‘[B]eing an object of an act is not exhausted by being 
physical or even sensory, since we can have a mental act as an object’, renders 
‘Brentano’s very notion of physical and psychical phenomena …largely incoherent’, 
and so, ‘(T)he whole account [of the distinction between physical and psychical 
phenomena] seems shot through with confusion’ Moran, ‘The Inaugural Address: 
Brentano’s Thesis’, pp. 21–2. David Bell expresses similar views in Husserl (London: 
Routledge, 1991), p. 9. Cf. Bartok’s remarks on this, however, in his ‘Brentano’s 
Intentionality Thesis’, p. 450.  See, also, n. 31 above.
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acts and its objects or its contents—is an intrinsic feature of 
consciousness itself; no more, no less. What such intentionality really 
depicts for Brentano, in truth, is the passive possession by consciousness 
of its objects or its contents. 54 
The particular ‘revaluation’ (Umwertung) of the scholastic concept of 
intentionality that Brentano makes—and one that Husserl stresses in his 
own work—concerns Brentano’s adaptation of the scholastic theory of 
the object-relatedness of acts of the will into a basic descriptive- 
psychological a priori tenet regarding the object-relatedness of all 
psychical-act experiences (Erlebnisse) that are characteristic of human 
consciousness. 55 This revaluation of the concept by Brentano, however, is 
clearly made from within Brentano’s adherence to the modern principle of 
immanence as defined and defended by Descartes, where the separation 
of a lucid mind and an opaque body in human subjectivity is 
metaphysically assumed, and where the mind is acknowledged as the first 
and primary reality for philosophical investigation. 56 This is one place 
54 Bartok appears to think that this very fact seems to safeguard both ‘a route’ and ‘a 
fairer reading’, ‘Brentano’s Intentionality Thesis’, p. 439—and possibly a plausible 
philosophical defence—of ‘Brentano’s thesis of intentionality’, as it would be not 
weighted down with either an excessively analytic or an excessively phenomenological 
concern; rather, as Bartok argues, ‘[F]rom the point of view of the ostensibly 
descriptive investigations that Brentano carries out in PES and DP such metaphysical 
issues simply do not arise. That is, as long as one remains at the level of analyzing 
description of what is revealed in inner perception, questions about the relationship 
between entities or ontological categories discovered therein either to the “external” 
or non-phenomenal world, or to the metaphysical framework within which the 
descriptive study itself operates, cannot even be posed’ (p. 453). That there is a dualistic 
metaphysical assumption of a radical separation of a lucid mind and an opaque body 
in human subjectivity ‘within which the descriptive study itself operates’ is at least 
implicitly acknowledged by Bartok (p. 444), though these implications are not drawn out 
in his paper. Such a metaphysical assumption  is sufficient for Heidegger in the 1920s, 
as well as other critics at the time, to maintain that the problem with Brentano’s and 
Husserl’s concept of the intentionality of consciousness is not intentionality as such 
but the metaphysical presuppositions underpinning both Brentano’s and Husserl’s 
modern-Cartesian-theoretical understanding of human subjectivity. 
55 Whether it was really Brentano or his pupils (Höfler, Meinong, Husserl, 
Twardowski) that are to be credited with this new concept, however, is a matter of 
dispute among commentators. See below n. 61 
56 According to Hedwig, ‘In contrast to Brentano, who usually refers to a historical 
context [of late Medieval Scholasticism, as is evident from the context], Husserl 
considers the conception of ‘mental’ or ‘intentional inexistence’ as an issue the 
potential adequacy of which must be tested by the description of the actual experience 
itself. This lack of historical references implies a first break with the philosophical 
tradition. At the same time, however, the specific ontological presuppositions 
according to which the intention is conceived as a kind of immanent-object-quality of
Cyril McDonnell 
Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society 2006 
148 
where a radical critique of this ‘thesis’ that Brentano elaborates could 
begin. 57 What this critique would call into question is not its ‘scientific’ or 
‘Scholastic-Aristotelian’ credentials but the dualistic metaphysical 
presuppositions underpinning Brentano’s Cartesian-Kantian view of 
human subjectivity in which human intentional consciousness as such is 
thematized in the elaboration of his new science of descriptive 
psychology. 58 
Brentano’s Modification of the Scholastic Concept of Intentional Object into a Root- 
Concept of Descriptive Psychology 
When Brentano first re-introduced the Scholastic terminology of 
intentionality in his 1874 publication of PES, he did not use the term 
‘intentional’ as an adverb modifying the activity of the relation of the acts 
of consciousness to its objects, however; rather, he employed the term 
‘intentional’ as an adjective qualifying the object in consciousness. In what 
is probably one of the most quoted passages from PES, Brentano 
famously remarks: 
Every psychical phenomenon is characterised by what the Scholastics of the 
Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and 
what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, 
consciousness are accepted without further qualifications. ‘Intention: Outlines for the 
History of a Phenomenological Concept’, p. 334.  Here Husserl, however, is following 
completely Brentano’s descriptive-psychological approach, with presuppositions in 
place, and claims that whatever corrections he has to make to Brentano’s ideas (of 
intentional act and intentional object) he does so precisely by following Brentano’s 
descriptive-psychological methodological demands. See Husserl’s ‘criticisms of the 
illuminating views of Brentano’ in his ‘Appendix: External and Internal Perception: 
Physical and Psychical Phenomena’, in (1913 edition) of Logical Investigations, pp. 852– 
69, p. 858.  Cf., also, Th. de Boer, ‘The Meaning of Husserl’s Idealism in the Light of 
his Development’, tr. by H. Pietersma, Analecta Husserliana, 2 (1972), pp. 322–32 
57 Such as has been undertaken in the work of Paul Ricoeur and Emmanuel Lévinas, 
for instance. 
58 Hence Heidegger’s condensed but correct assessment of Brentano and Husserl’s 
thematization of the intentionality of consciousness in his 1925 lectures delivered at 
Marburg University, that ‘it is not intentionality as such that is metaphysically 
dogmatic but what is built under its structure.’ Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time: 
Prolegomena, trans. by Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 
pp. 46–7. Whether Heidegger’s thematizing of human existence in ‘Dasein’ (in the way 
he understands that term) and which in Heidegger’s opinion grounds ‘the 
intentionality of “consciousness’’’ contains in its very conceptualisation metaphysically 
dogmatic and phenomenologically unjustifiable assumptions is, of course, another 
thing, but one that will not be entertained here. Cf. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 
trans. Macquarrie & Robinson, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967) p. 298, n. xxiii
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direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a 
thing), or immanent objectivity. Every psychical phenomenon includes 
something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same 
way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is 
affirmed or denied, in love [something is] loved, in hate [something is] hated, 
in desire [something is] desired and so on (PES, p. 88). 
This 1874 passage has evoked an immense amount of discussion and 
disagreement among commentators and critics concerning what exactly 
Brentano is saying, what he is not saying, what he means to say, what he 
does not mean to say, what is meant in the passage, and what is not 
meant in the passage. 59 Without endeavouring to unravel such 
controversy, and turning to the 1874 passage itself, Brentano defines 
psychical-act experiences, employing no less than ‘five typifying 
expressions’. 60 Every psychical phenomenon is characterised by (1) the 
intentional inexistence of an object, (2) the mental inexistence of an 
object, (3) an immanent objectivity, (4) reference to a content, and (5) 
direction towards an object. Expressions (1), (2) and (3) for Brentano, as 
de Boer notes, ‘are fully synonymous.’ These expressions all point to the 
fact that psychical-act experiences ‘include a content’, and that ‘this 
content is more precisely defined as intentional or immanent or mental’. 61 
All of these expressions, therefore, depict unequivocally and univocally 
the mental immanence of objects in any given (temporal) psychical-act 
experience. 
Expressions (4) and (5) are different aspects of psychical-act 
experiences. They are concerned with the directedness or relation 
(Richtung, Beziehung) of a psychical-act experience towards a content or an 
object. In the 1874 passage, Brentano understands these expressions to 
be describing the same thing, namely, the object-relatedness of psychical- 
act experiences. (It is only sometime after PES that Brentano speaks about 
59 Commentators have found any number of theses defining the psychical in this 1874 
passage, from one to four. Victor Caston maintains that Brentano offers no definition 
at all of intentionality in this passage. Rather, Caston believes and stresses the point 
that ‘Brentano does not attempt to define intentionality. Instead, he appeals to medieval 
terminology to indicate what he is talking about and then, by way of explication, 
offers three glosses of his own: (i) possessing content, (ii) being directed upon an 
object, and (iii) having the object present in the act. All three are metaphorical—in 
fact, the first appeals to the very same metaphor as the third.’ V. Caston, ‘Towards a 
History of the Problem of Intentionality Among the Greeks’, in Proceedings of the Boston 
Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, Vol. IX, 1993, ed. by John. J. Cleary and William 
Wians (New York: University Press of America, 1995), pp. 213–45 p. 217 
60 De Boer, The Development of Husserl’s Thought, p. 6 
61 Ibid.
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this defining characteristic of psychical-act experiences in terms of an 
‘intentional relation’.) Thus Passmore is correct to note that Brentano takes 
‘these phrases [i.e. (4) and (5)] to be synonymous’. 62 Spiegelberg is also, 
therefore, correct to conclude about the 1874 passage that here Brentano 
gives us not one, as he says, but two defining characteristics of psychical- 
act experiences: one concerning the immanence of objects in 
consciousness and another concerning the directedness of consciousness 
towards its object or content. 63 Roderick M. Chisholm, likewise, 
62 Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, p. 178. Twardowski thought that here 
Brentano blurred two different kinds of ‘presentations’ (Vorstellungen) that evidently 
occurred in an act of outer perceptual-sense experience e.g. the flower growing in the 
garden (qua real object) and one’s awareness of the flower growing in the garden (qua 
content of knowledge). This issue was both a subject of dispute between Twardowski 
and Brentano, and a point of departure by Twardowski from Brentano’s position of 
PES. Moran resurrects this controversial issue, when he remarks that, ‘[F]rom the 
passage quoted above [referring to Brentano’s 1874 PES passage], we see that 
Brentano employed two different formulations—between which he never 
distinguished: (i) directedness towards an object (die Richtung auf eine Objekt), and (ii) 
‘relation to a content’ (die Beziehung auf einen Inhalt). He [Brentano] never separated his 
account of the intentional object from the notion of intentionality as a relation’ (‘The 
Inaugural Address: Brentano’s Thesis’, p. 5). Moran believes that Twardowski, who does 
make this distinction in his 1894 study, gives the better account here. See Moran’s further 
analysis on these lines in his An Introduction to Phenomenology, Ch. 1 ‘Franz Brentano: 
Descriptive Psychology and Intentionality’, in a section entitled ‘Twardowski’s 
modification of Brentanian descriptive psychology’, pp. 55–9. It seems to me, 
however, that re-introducing Twardowski’s 1894 distinction back into Brentano’s 
1874 passage is neither philosophically helpful or historically accurate in 
understanding Brentano’s thesis, contrary to the approach outlined and taken in ‘The 
Inaugural Address: Brentano’s Thesis’, pp. 1–2. 
63 About this ‘second characterization of the psychic phenomenon, “reference to an 
object,”’ Spiegelberg remarks in his famous, widely consulted and re-issued study The 
Phenomenological Movement that, ‘as far as I can make out, this characterisation is 
completely original with Brentano’, but in Spiegelberg’s opinion, ‘(I)t was certainly 
none of Brentano’s doing that this new wholly unscholastic conception came to sail 
under the old flag of ‘intentionality’ (3rd edn 1994, 37; 1st edn, 1976, p. 40). Rather, 
Spiegelberg believes that ‘it is only in Husserl’s thought that the term “intentional” 
acquired the meaning of directedness toward an object rather than that of the object’s 
immanence in consciousness (1994, p. 97).’ Simons exercises a similar viewpoint in his 
‘Introduction to the Second Edition’ of the re-print of the English translation of 
Brentano’s PES (1995, p. xix), believing that it is Brentano’s students (Höfler, 
Meinong, and Twardowski) rather than Brentano himself, who are responsible for the 
unScholastic conception of ‘intentional act’ being promulgated in the 1890s. 
Nevertheless, Spiegelberg does correctly note that for Brentano ‘the second 
characterization of the psychic phenomenon, “reference to an object,”’—one that 
Brentano had spotted in PES (1874)—‘is … the only permanent one for Brentano’ 
(The Phenomenological Movement, 3rd edn, p. 37) because ‘Brentano came to reject during
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comments that ‘this passage contains two different theses: one, an 
ontological thesis about the nature of certain objects of thought and of 
other psychological attitudes; the other, a psychological thesis, implying 
reference to an object’. 64 These two features, nevertheless, express 
different things about the psychical, and so, they should be ‘carefully 
distinguished’, as De Boer has pointed out. 65 Often, however, they are 
not, and so, often they are confused. 66 According to Brentano himself, 
what Brentano scholars call the crisis of immanence (‘Immanenzkrise’) of 1905 … ‘[the] 
very doctrine of the mental inexistence of the object of knowledge in the soul.’ (ibid., 
p. 48, n. 19) Moran thinks that ‘Husserl’s own breakthrough insight concerning 
intentionality came in 1898 (as he later recalled in Krisis) when he realised there was a 
‘universal a priori correlation between experienced object and manners of givenness’. 
In other words, that intentionality really encapsulated the entire set of relations 
between subjectivity and every form of objectivity’ Edmund Husserl: Founder of 
Phenomenology, pp. 18–19. Whoever promulgated the exact notion of the ‘object- 
relatedness’ of the ‘intentional act’ of consciousness, Husserl himself credits Brentano 
with the initial revaluation (Umwertung) of the Scholastic theory of the object- 
relatedness of acts of the will into a descriptive root-concept of the object relatedness 
of all psychical-act experiences (and credits himself with the working out of the 
implications of such ‘correlativity’ in the development of his own idea of 
phenomenology). Cf. Husserl’s remarks on ‘Brentano as pathfinder (Brentano als 
Wegbereiter)’ in Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester 1925, ‘Section (d) 
Brentano as pioneer for research in internal experience—discovery of intentionality as 
the fundamental character of the psychic’, pp. 23–7 
64 ‘Intentionality’, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edwards, 1967, p. 201 
65 The Development of Husserl’s Thought, p. 6 
66 According to Jacquette, ‘The passage is often said to contain two distinct theses. 
The first is an assertion about the ontological status of the objects of thought, and the 
second offers the intentional in-existence criterion of psychic phenomena’, 
‘Brentano’s Concept of Intentionality’, p. 125, n. 5. Such a gloss on Brentano’s 1874 
passage, however, makes two theses of one thesis because ‘the ontological status of 
the objects of thought’ and ‘the intentional in-existence [of an object] criterion of 
psychic phenomena’ cover the same territory for Brentano, namely, the thesis of 
immanence of objects in consciousness, whereas ‘relation to a content’ is another 
distinguishing feature of the acts of consciousness for Brentano. Jacquette, however, 
does continue to inform us that ‘We are equally concerned with both of Brentano’s 
theses, with the idea that the intentionality of thought distinguishes the psychological 
from the nonpsychological, and with the problems raised by Brentano’s obscure 
discussion of immanent intentionality, relation to a content, or intentional in- 
existence’ (ibid.). Spiegelberg, who recognises the two distinct theses of immanence of 
objects in consciousness and the directedness of consciousness towards an object, 
nevertheless, obscures this matter likewise by maintaining that, ‘[O]ne thing is clear, 
however; for Brentano the term ‘intentional’ is intimately connected with a 
conception of the experiential structure according to which all objects to which an 
experience relates are at the same time contained in this experience, they exist within 
it’ ‘“Intention’ and ‘Intentionality” in the Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl’, p. 120. 
Daniel C. Dennett makes a similar point about ‘Brentano’s thesis’, when he remarks
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however, out of all the characteristics of consciousness that are expressed 
in the 1874 passage, it is the fact that a psychical-act experience contains an 
object intentionally (mentally) within itself that enables us to evidently 
identify and positively distinguish ‘psychical phenomena in general’ (i.e. 
actual acts of sensing, thinking, willing, understanding, misunderstanding, 
loving, hating, fearing, despairing, hoping, worrying, taking an interest, no 
interest or a disinterest in something, and so forth) from ‘physical 
phenomena in general’ (i.e., colours I see, sounds I hear, odours I smell, 
tactile objects I touch, and the immediately presented objects of all acts of 
human consciousness, including normative acts of judgement, such as, 
for example, the content of a logical proposition). 67 Brentano makes this 
that according to Brentano ‘some mental phenomena are “directed upon” an object 
(and these objects have unusual characteristics), and other mental phenomena are 
related to a content or proposition or meaning. There is some difficulty … in wielding 
these two parts into a single characteristic of Intentionality, and yet intuitively 
Brentano’s insight is about one characteristic and an important one’ Consciousness and 
Content (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969; Routledge: 1996), p. 20. Again, a 
similar point is made by Moran for, according to this commentator, ‘He [Brentano] 
never separated his account of the intentional object from the notion of intentionality 
as a relation. They express the one notion. In fact, if anything, his account of the 
intentional relation tends to collapse into his account of the intentional object’ ‘The 
Inaugural Address: Brentano’s Thesis’, p. 5. Simons blames Brentano himself for the 
confusion of the two theses, by suggesting that ‘Brentano had contributed to the 
ambiguity by offering several paraphrases of the phrase ‘‘intentional inexistence”: 
mental inexistence, existence as an object (objectively) in something, reference to a 
content, direction to an object, immanent object. … Clearly they do not here mean 
intention in the sense of purpose, design, intent to do something, though the two 
notions are related.’ (‘Introduction to the Second Edition’, PES (1995), p. xx). Simons 
does not explain how the two notions of the ‘intentional’ or ‘mental inexistence of an 
object in consciousness’ and ‘reference to a content, direction to an object’, which are 
not to be confused with the notion of ‘intention in the sense of purpose’, are related 
in Brentano’s thought (or in any other philosopher’s thought, such as, for instance, 
and in particular, St Thomas). The conflation of the two theses continues in Bartok’s 
recent gloss on the 1874 passage as maintaining, ‘all and only mental phenomena [in 
comparison to physical phenomena] are characterized by the intentional inexistence of 
or directedness toward an object, a claim [my emphasis] that has come to be known as 
“Brentano’s intentionality thesis” or simply “Brentano’s thesis”’, ‘Brentano’s 
Intentionality Thesis’, p. 437. 
67 According to Brentano, there are two, and only two classes of phenomena, namely, 
physical and psychical phenomena given to corresponding acts of outer and inner 
perception (PES, p. 77). Because Brentano admits of only two kinds of objects 
(psychical and physical phenomena) corresponding to two forms of perception (inner 
and outer perception), the ‘thinking of a general concept’ (PES, p. 79) because the 
content of a logical judgement is not itself an actual act of thinking (a psychical 
phenomenon), has to be regarded by Brentano as a ‘physical phenomenon’ (in the 
sense of a directly intended object). This is why Moran is correct to note that, for
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very clear in the passage immediately following the famous 1874 passage, 
where he declares: 
This intentional in-existence (intentionale Inexistenz) is characteristic exclusively 
of psychical phenomena. No physical phenomena exhibit anything like it. We 
can, therefore, define psychical phenomena by saying that they are those 
phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves. (PES, 
pp. 88–89) 
And in a later passage Brentano re-iterates this point, saying that ‘we use 
the term ‘consciousness’ to refer to any psychical phenomenon [i.e. any 
actual psychical-act experience], insofar as it has a content’ (PES, p. 
138). 68 Indeed, Brentano is thoroughly aware of the fact that the meaning 
of this particular concept of ‘the intentional (or mental) in-existence of an 
object’ that he claims to have found in Medieval-Aristotelian Scholastic 
philosophy is not one that is well-known at all in everyday discourse or one with 
which contemporary natural scientists are familiar because later on in PES he 
explicitly remarks in relation to the difficulty of settling disputes over 
both the meaning and the referent of the term ‘consciousness’, 
In the first place … the term ‘consciousness,’ since it refers to an object which 
consciousness is conscious of, [it] seems to be appropriate to characterise 
psychical phenomena [conscious acts] precisely in terms of its 
[consciousness’s] distinguishing characteristic, i.e., the property of the 
intentional in-existence of an object, for which we lack a word in common usage 
(PES, p. 102, my emphasis). 
In relation to his own use and understanding of this concept of ‘intentional 
in-existence’, Brentano believes that he is in complete agreement with 
Aristotle’s position on this matter, for, Brentano explicitly tells us in an 
extended footnote added to the 1874 passage explaining the origin and 
development of this concept in Ancient Greek and Medieval philosophy 
that, 
Brentano, ‘physical phenomena are not just sense qualities (tastes, colours etc.), but 
also include more abstract presentations such as ‘thinking of a general concept’ (PES, 
p. 79); … abstract objects like triangles … the mental life of others, e.g. ‘I know what 
you are thinking’ …. And of course in thinking of a triangle, which we might consider 
to be a mental object par excellence, for Brentano, the triangle is a physical 
phenomenon’. ‘The Inaugural Address: Brentano’s Thesis’, p. 21 
68 And later still, Brentano re-iterates this same point again: ‘Nothing distinguishes 
psychical phenomena from physical phenomena more than the fact that something is 
immanent as an object in them’ (PES, p. 197). In PES, then, Brentano does not write 
about die intentionale Beziehung, as many commentators intimate, but about the 
‘intentional in-existence of an object’ in consciousness.
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Aristotle himself spoke of this psychical indwelling (psychische Einwohnung).  In his 
books on the soul he says that the sensed object, as such, is in the sensing subject; 
that the sense contains the sensed object without its matter; that the object which is 
thought is in the thinking intellect (PES, p. 88 n.). 69 
And in another footnote, added this time by Brentano to the re-issue of 
(part of) his PES in 1911, 70 Brentano directly complains about the 
misunderstanding of the meaning of this concept of ‘the intentional 
inexistence of an object’ that he had first employed in the 1874 passage, 71 
remarking that, 
This expression [‘the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object’] had been 
misunderstood in that some people thought it had to do with intention and the 
pursuit of a goal.  In view of this, I might have done better to avoid it altogether. 
Instead of the term ‘intentional’ the Scholastics very frequently used the expression 
‘objective’. This has to do with the fact that something is an object for the mentally 
active subject, and, as such, is present in some manner in his consciousness, whether 
it is merely thought of or also desired, shunned, etc. I preferred the expression 
‘intentional’ because I thought there would be an even greater danger of being 
misunderstood if I had described the object of thought as ‘objectively existing,’ for 
modern-day thinkers use this expression to refer to what really exists as opposed to 
‘mere subjective appearances’ (PES, pp. 180–181 n.). 72 
Brentano, therefore, would lead us to believe both in the 1874 passage 
and in the 1874 and 1911 footnotes that he has not deviated, in any 
significant sense, from the meaning of the original Scholastic-Aristotelian 
concept of the abstracted form of sense residing intentionally as an object 
in the soul of the knower, and similarly existing objects of thought or of 
any psychical-act experience in consciousness. 73 
69 English translation of ‘mental inexistence’ for ‘psychische Einwohnung’ changed to 
‘psychical indwelling’. Cf., note on p. 125 of German text. 
70 Brentano re-issued only Chapters 5–9 of Book II Psychical Phenomena in General, 
under the heading ‘The Classification of Mental Phenomena’, of PES followed by an 
Appendix.  Cf. Brentano, ‘Foreword to the 1911 Edition, The Classification of Mental 
Phenomena’, PES, pp. xix–xx. 
71 The famous 1874 passage, however, was not part of the re-issue of the selected texts 
of Chapters 5–9 of Book II of PES for re-issue in 1911, as it occurs in Chapter I of 
Book II of PES. 
72 Cf. Herbert Spiegelberg, ‘“Intention” and “Intentionality” in the Scholastics, 
Brentano and Husserl’, in Linda L. McAlister ed. The Philosophy of Brentano (London: 
Duckworth), pp. 108–27, pp. 120–21 
73 Spiegelberg agrees with Brentano’s self-interpretation on this issue, and thereby 
misses the significant changes that Brentano actually makes to this concept of the
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Brentano, however, is not the sole authority in the interpretation of 
his own text, or of the text of anyone else, for that matter. 74 Aristotle did 
not hold the view that ‘the sensed object without its matter’, when this is 
taken as referring to the abstracted form of sense knowledge residing 
intentionally in the soul of the knower, is the immediate and direct object 
of outer perceptual-sense knowledge, as Brentano himself clearly holds in 
PES (and in his lectures on DP). The immediate objects of sense 
knowledge for Aristotle and the Aristotelians are ‘physical things’ and their 
accidental modifications and properties existing ‘in the external world’, as 
Brentano had originally defended in his 1866 Habilitation thesis on The 
Psychology of Aristotle, in Particular His Doctrine of the Active Intellect. 75 The 
abstracted form residing intentionally in the soul of knower that is advanced in 
Scholastic epistemology. It has been pointed out by Spiegelberg that the terminology 
of Intentionalität was not actually used by Brentano but by Husserl. Moran agrees with 
Spiegelberg, noting that, ‘The technical term intentionalitas did have currency in the late 
Middle Ages, and used to refer to the character of the logical distinction between 
prima and secunda intentio, but the modern use of the term intentionality owes to 
Husserl and not Brentano’ (An Introduction to Phenomenology, p. 482, n. 80). 
Nevertheless, the concepts of intention of the will (intentio voluntatis) and intentional 
indwelling ([in]esse intentionale) were familiar concepts deployed in Scholastic theory of 
volition and in Scholastic metaphysics respectively, and the latter metaphysical 
concept is applied in the Scholastic epistemological concept of the abstracted form of 
sense (or intelligible species) residing intentionally in the soul of the knower. Brentano 
was well acquainted with all of these Scholastic concepts. Brentano, however, as we 
shall see in this section, deviates considerably from the original Scholastic meaning in 
his elaboration of the meaning that he gives to the concept of the ‘intentional (or 
mental) in-existence of an object’ in consciousness in PES, just as we have seen in the 
previous section how he deviated from the Scholastic concept of ‘intentional relation’ 
in depicting the object-relatedness of acts of consciousness in the elaboration of his 
descriptive psychology in DP. It is of both philosophical and historical significance to 
note that Husserl’s acquaintance with the concept of ‘intentionality’ comes in the 
aftermath of Brentano’s descriptive-psychological modification of both the Scholastic 
volitional concept of intention as ‘intentional act’ and the Scholastic epistemological- 
metaphysical concept of intention as ‘intentional [indwelling] object’. 
74 Bartok’s recent reiteration that ‘He [Brentano] insisted that the central doctrines of 
his psychology, the doctrines of intentionality and inner perception, were doctrines 
that had clear precedents in the work of Aristotle and the Scholastics’, ‘Brentano’s 
Intentionality Thesis’ p. 454, is just that, however, a reiteration of Brentano’s own 
misleading, self-interpretation. Cf., also, Bartok’s corresponding references at p. 454 n. 
59. Brentano develops two entirely un-Scholastic-Aristotelian doctrines of ‘intentional 
relation (in the acts of consciousness)’ and ‘intentional object (in the mentally active 
subject)’. And Brentano means at least four different things by inner perception, only 
one of them, strictly speaking, is of clear Aristotelian ancestry, namely, ‘incidental 
awareness’. See above, n. 32. 
75 Cf. Brentano, The Psychology of Aristotle, in Particular His Doctrine of the Active Intellect, 
esp., ‘Part III. Of the Sensitive Soul’, pp. 54–74
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immediate objects of sense knowledge for Aristotle and the Aristotelians 
are not sensorially perceivable qualities (e.g. a colour, or a sound) that 
exist only as long as the actual outer perceptual-sense experience exists. 76 
This is why Lawson-Tancred is correct to re-iterate Richard Sorabji’s 
point that for Aristotle the psychical indwelling of abstracted forms of 
sense cannot be regarded as an exclusive property of the human soul 
because while they exist in actuality in the knower’s soul ‘in a manner of 
speaking’, however difficult that might be to fully understand, they also 
exist in potentiality as accidental modifications of substances outside in 
the world. 77 In this regard, the ‘intentional (or mental) in-existence’ of 
abstracted forms of sense ‘cannot be [for Aristotle] a hallmark of the sense 
object as such, as Brentano needs it’. 78 For Brentano, however, outside of 
the abstracted form as such, which are now understood by Brentano to 
be Lockean secondary qualities of outer perceptual-sense experience (e.g. 
a colour I actually see, a sound I actually hear), such ‘physical phenomena’ 
(colours and sounds) do not exist ‘objectively’ like that in any real sense at 
all as Aristotle and the medieval Aristotelians would have it, for example, 
as accidents inhering in substances; rather, they exist as actual light 
particles and sine waves as Brentano stresses in his 1911 footnote and 
throughout PES (and DP).  Thus unlike Aristotle, Brentano can declare in 
his new descriptive-psychological scheme of things that ‘the intentional or mental 
in-existence of an object’, such as, for instance, a colour or a sound as it 
76 In Scholastic realism, acts of sensation are not, automatically, acts of sense 
cognition, though the latter acts are dependent upon the first and a result of a co- 
operation between acts of sensation and acts of cognition in the knower. See n. 29 
above. 
77 Hugh Lawson-Tancred, ‘Introduction’, in Aristotle, De Anima (On the Soul), 
(London: Penguin, 1986), pp. 101–3. Sorabji also notes that for the Islamic and 
Medieval Aristotelians the abstracted form of sense residing intentionally in the soul 
of the knower, though a sign for the real thing existing extra-mentally, ‘cannot yet 
imply awareness of the message’ ‘From Aristotle to Brentano: The Development of the 
Concept of Intentionality’, p. 241, as it does in Brentano’s 1874 passage. Thus Sorabji 
concludes, correctly, that ‘Brentano’s interpretation [in PES] was not faithful to 
Thomas, for whom intentional being did not imply awareness, although it may have 
implied a message’ p. 248. Brentano did hold this position in his 1866 The Psychology of 
Aristotle, arguing that an act of knowledge, on the part of the knowing subject, ‘does 
not imply in any way that the subject of the intellect is conscious of its intellectual 
properties’ (p. 92). ‘[A]lthough it [the intellect] knows itself, it does not know itself 
either always or in the beginning, but only secondarily’ p. 88. 
78 Tancred-Lawson, ‘Introduction’, in Aristotle, De Anima (On the Soul), p. 104
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occurs in its respective psychical-act experience, is an exclusive property 
of our actual acts of outer perceptual-sense experience. 79 
Spiegelberg, therefore, is correct to note that in the 1874 passage 
‘“intentional” for Brentano refers to the property of an object which is 
immanent in consciousness in a way analogous to that in which the 
species are immanent in the Thomistic-Aristotelian theory of 
knowledge’. 80 The comparison is between the kind of existence 
characteristic of mental objects (qua abstracted forms of intelligibility) and 
extra-mental real objects (real things or substances in the world). When 
considered as the immediate objects of consciousness, the objects of 
sense and of thought (and of all psychical-act experiences), according to 
Brentano, do not have ‘real’ substantial existence either inside or outside 
of the mind, rather, they have ‘intentional existence (in the mentally active 
subject)’, in an analogous fashion to the way in which the abstracted form 
of sense or intentio or species is said to exist intentionally in the soul of the 
knower in Scholastic theory of knowledge. This ‘similarity between 
Brentano’s doctrine and the intentional inexistence of the Scholastics’ has 
been re-iterated by many commentators, and has been compared 
79 Herein lies one potent source for later questions pertaining to the irreducibility, or 
otherwise, of the ‘mental’ to the ‘physical’ that has either occupied or vexed many 
analytic commentators on ‘Brentano’s thesis’. Cf. Moran’s conclusion that ‘those who 
invoke Brentano as guardian of mental irreducibility are just plain wrong’ ‘The 
Inaugural Address: Brentano’s Thesis’, p. 27. Brentano’s stress on the intended object 
of outer perceptual-sense experience as an exclusive property of one’s own psychical- 
act experiences, however, causes later followers, such as Husserl, problems with 
accounting for our relationship to that which exists outside and yet integral to 
interpersonal relationships between oneself an another human being. See below, 
footnotes 107 and 108 
80 Spiegelberg, ‘“Intention” and “Intentionality” in the Scholastics, Brentano and 
Husserl’, p. 122. Spiegelberg originally published this article in 1933/34 in German as 
‘Der Begriff der Intentionalität in der Scholastik, bei Brentano und bei Husserl’. It is 
referred to as ‘the classic article on Brentano’ by Sorabji in ‘From Aristotle to 
Brentano: The Development of the Concept of Intentionality’, (1991), Supplementary 
Volume: Aristotle and the Later Tradition, ed. by H. Blumenthal and H. Robinson, pp. 
227–59, esp. pp. 247–8, n. 116, though unfortunately, it is mis-titled in the note as 
‘‘‘Intention” and “Intentionality” in the Scholastics, Brentano and [viz.] Hegel’. Victor 
Caston refers to Spiegelberg’s article as ‘a path breaking article of 1936’, and that 
‘(H)is [Spiegelberg’s] results have so far been challenged only on points of detail; his 
overall approach, to the best of my knowledge, has not’. ‘Towards a History of the 
Problem of Intentionality among the Greeks’, (1993), p. 218. I would like to draw 
attention to De Boer’s extensive and meticulous study The Development of Husserl’s 
Thought, first published in Dutch in 1966 and translated into English in 1978, which 
challenges many major and fundamental points of detail (and the approach) upon which 
Spiegelberg’s influential interpretation of the concept of intentionality in the 
Scholastics, Brentano and Husserl rests.
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favourably, for example, to ‘St Thomas Aquinas’s commentary on the 
relevant passage in Aristotle’s De Anima’ where St Thomas remarks, 
[S]ense receives the form without the matter, since form has a different mode 
of being in sense perception than it has in the sensible thing.  For in the 
sensible thing it has natural being; but in sense perception it has intentional 
being. 81 
Unlike St Thomas and the Scholastics, however, Brentano regards the 
abstracted form of sense, this intentional or mental object of perceptual 
consciousness, as the end term of outer perceptual-sense experience (or of 
sense judgement) in PES. Outside of the perceptual experience of 
immanent colours and sounds, there exist light rays and sine waves. 
Colours and sounds have ‘only phenomenal and intentional [= mental] 
existence’ in comparison to the theoretically constructed objects of 
physics. The theoretical objects of natural sciences, as a matter of 
established natural-scientific fact, in Brentano’s view, really and truly exist. 
It now thus follows for Brentano that our everyday normal acts of outer 
sense perception of physical phenomena (i.e. of colours) are inherently 
and naturally misleading because they take their objects (e.g. colours) to 
be existing ‘out there’ as it were, say, as accidents of hylomorphically 
constituted substances, just as Aristotle and the Aristotelians would have 
it, when they do not exist ‘out there’ as such. ‘For this reason, anyone 
who in good faith has taken them for what they seem to be is being 
misled by the manner in which the phenomena are connected.’ (PES, p. 
91) Brentano’s view of our normal acts of outer perceptual-sense 
experience, such as seeing things coloured in the external world, as an 
inherently deceptive mode of knowledge indicates just how 
unAristotelian-unscholastic Brentano’s views are in PES and in DP. 82 By 
1874, therefore, Brentano has relinquished entirely any Aristotelian- 
epistemological theory of abstraction—with which ‘Brentano had concerned 
himself [my emphasis] a good deal’ in the mid 1860s, as Spiegelberg 
81 Linda L. McAlister, ‘Brentano’s Epistemology’ in The Cambridge Guide to Brentano, ed. 
Jacquette, pp. 149–67, p. 153 
82 Brentano’s view here on our normal acts of outer sense perception as being 
inherently deceptive is closer to St Thomas’ views on abnormal sense knowledge, such 
as, for instance, as St Thomas says, ‘(I)n the case of ourselves, deception comes about 
really in accordance with phantasia through which occasionally we cling to the likeness 
of things as if they were the things themselves, as is clear with people sleeping or the 
mad’ Summa Theologiae, 1, 54, 5, quoted by Marras, ‘The Scholastic Roots of Brentano’s 
Conception of Intentionality’, p. 134.
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notes 83 —and, in its stead, adopted a version of direct mental (Cartesian– 
Lockean–Humean) representationalism against a background acceptance 
of the dominant natural-scientific world-view as expressed in his time. 84 
These are Brentano’s (new) concerns in PES, as Bartok correctly reminds 
us. 85 
Brentano’s self-interpretation of his concurrence with the 
Thomistic-Aristotelian epistemological concept of the intentional 
indwelling of the ‘sensed object without its matter’ in the soul of the 
knower both in the footnotes appended to the 1874 passage and added to 
the 1911 re-issue, and Spiegelberg’s and many others’ re-iteration of that 
self-interpretation, 86 all overlook real and major conceptual differences 
between the way in which ‘the species’ or ‘intentio’, qua abstracted form, is 
said to be present in the soul of the knower in Thomistic-Aristotelian 
theory of knowledge and the way in which Brentano in the actual 1874 
passage regards the presence of the intentional object of sense, and a 
fortiori the presence of any intentional object as an immanent content 
residing in consciousness. Thus Brentano’s deviation from both the 
Scholastic general metaphysical concept of intentional being (esse 
intentionale) and the Scholastic understanding of the application of this 
concept in their theory of knowledge requires careful analysis. For 
brevity, I will draw attention only to two major differences between the 
meaning of the concept of ‘intentional indwelling’ in Scholasticism and in 
the 1874 passage of PES, and to one highly significant similarity between 
the Scholastics and ‘Brentano’s thesis’ that remains thoroughly alive both 
83 Spiegelberg, ‘‘‘Intention” and “Intentionality” in the Scholastics, Brentano and 
Husserl’, p. 122 
84 Brentano’s shift in terminology away from ‘physical things’ in his 1866 Psychology of 
Aristotle, and towards ‘physical phenomena’ in his 1874 PES, by which Brentano 
means sounds I actually hear, colours I actually see, odours I actually smell, so-called 
qualia of sense experience, should be suffice to alert commentators to the major 
conceptual shift in Brentano’s entire understanding of (philosophical) psychology. 
85 Bartok, ‘Brentano’s Intentionality Thesis’, esp. pp. 443–4; pp. 448–9 
86 Cf., also, Chisholm’s famous explication of ‘Brentano’s thesis’. According to 
Chisholm: ‘There is a distinction between a man who is thinking about a unicorn and 
a man who is thinking about nothing; in the former case, the man is intentionally 
related to an object, but in the latter case he is not. What, then, is the status of this 
object? It cannot be an actual unicorn, since there are not unicorns. According to the 
doctrine of intentional inexistence, the object of the thought about a unicorn is a 
unicorn, but a unicorn with a mode of being (intentional inexistence, immanent 
objectivity, or existence in the understanding) that is short of actuality but more than 
nothingness and that … lasts for just the length of time that the unicorn is thought 
about.’ R. M. Chisholm, ‘Intentionality’, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (1967), p. 201
Cyril McDonnell 
Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society 2006 
160 
in the 1874 PES passage and in Husserl’s later (in)famous transcendental 
reduction documented in Ideas I (1913). 
In Scholastic metaphysics, the order of intentional indwelling or 
intentional being-in (in) esse intentionale is opposed to the order of natural 
being, esse naturale or esse naturae. 87 In nature, things can really exist in one 
another, and alongside one another, such as, for instance, matches in a 
matchbox or water in a glass tumbler. By contrast, a thing existing 
intentionally in another thing denotes a flowing and incomplete presence 
of the nature of one being in another being, e.g., the intentional presence 
of the sun in daylight or of a user of an instrument in using that 
instrument. 88 The woodcutter, for instance, who uses an axe to cut down 
a tree, does not really or naturally exist ‘in’ the axe as the tree is being 
hewn, nor does the axe really or naturally exist ‘in’ the woodcutter in the 
process. In their natural order of being both the woodcutter standing 
beside the tree and the axe lying on the ground are really distinct and 
separate realities. When the woodcutter, however, picks up the axe and 
fells the tree, there is an intentional union (unio intentionalis) of both 
woodcutter and axe in each other. From a general metaphysical point of 
view, the woodcutter is now said to be present intentionally in the axe 
used and the axe is intentionally present in the woodcutter. Of course the 
woodcutter is also intentionally doing the action and for a purpose but 
these volitional and teleological concepts of intentio (as tendere in aliud) are 
completely unconnected to the metaphysical concept of (in)esse intentionale. 
Rather, the latter concept of something ‘being intentionally present in’ 
another thing denotes the way one thing exists in another thing not 
‘really’, or ‘solidly’, or ‘totally’ but flowing incompletely (fluens et 
incompleta). 89 From a Scholastic metaphysical point of view, therefore, the 
woodcutter is said to be intentionally present in the axe used to cut down 
87 Cf. Simonin, ‘La Notion d’intentio’ p. 456, and de Boer, The Development of Husserl’s 
Thought, p. 44 
88 Quoting St Thomas, A. Hayen remarks, ‘Instrumentalis virtus … est fluens et 
incompleta in esse naturae.’ Hence, as Hayen comments, ‘La virtus instumentalis, 
ensuite, ne possède qu’une réalité fugitive, ‘fluide’, mouvante, et pour ainsi dire 
‘spirituelle’ au sens primitif du mot, qui oppose l’inconsistance d’un souffle aérien à la 
solidité du corps robuste et résistant’ A. Hayen, L’Intentionnel dans la philosophie de St. 
Thomas, (Paris, 1942), p. 98. Cf., also, James S. Alberston, ‘Instrumental Causality in St. 
Thomas’, The New Scholasticism, 28 (1954), pp. 409–5 
89 Such a mode of being, therefore, is a spiritual form of being (A. Hayen, p. 98), but it 
would be quite absurd for St Thomas (as it was for St Augustine) to consider such a 
spiritual (spiritale) mode of indwelling as mental (mentale) indwelling precisely because 
such indwelling (inesse intentionale) is a distinct mode of being from both the bodily or 
corporeal kind and the intellectual or mental kind. Cf. Gerard Watson, Phantasia: in 
Classical Thought (Officina Typographica: Galway University Press, 1988), p. 141
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the tree, but the woodcutter is not really ‘in’ the axe in the same way that 
a match is really in a match-box, nor is the player of a lyre really present 
‘in’ the instrument being played unless he is playing it so badly that you 
take it off him and hit him over the head with it, and then he may be said 
to be existing not intentionally but really in the lyre, and so forth. A thing 
existing intentionally in another thing, therefore, denotes a flowing and 
incomplete presence of the nature of one being in another being. 
For the Scholastics, then, this mode of ‘intentional in-dwelling of 
one object in another’ is a discernible feature in the relationship between 
many things throughout the cosmos. In fact, the Scholastics appealed to 
this concept of ‘intentional indwelling’ in their theology as a way of trying 
to ‘understand’ their faith in the mystery of the triune God, where love of 
the Father for the Son and love of the Son for the Father is manifested in 
and through the intentional indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Such an 
account of intentional union (unio intentionalis) retains the notion of ‘three 
persons’ ‘in’ the ‘one substance’, and not the notion of three substances 
really existing in one substance (i.e., three Gods in one God), nor the 
notion of one substance comprising three real distinct parts, with three 
interlocking real relations, making up in total one God (i.e., three real 
parts of one God). Brentano himself alludes to this theological 
deployment of the concept of intentional in-dwelling by St Augustine and 
the Scholastics in their reflections on the triune God, in the extended 
footnote that accompanies the 1874 passage, and which many 
commentators note. And it is this same general metaphysical concept of 
‘intentional indwelling’ that is being put to work specifically in the 
Scholastic epistemological theory of the abstracted intelligible species that 
resides intentionally, as opposed to really, in the soul of the knower. What 
this theory tries to explain is how I can become a knower of things (i.e. 
abstract their forms) without becoming those real things themselves 
because the real form does not reside in the intellectual part of my soul 
but an abstracted image or representative through which [id quo] I know the 
physical thing resides intentionally, and not really, in the intellect of the 
knower. 90 Thus the knower becomes what he knows ‘in a manner of 
90 Just as we are usually unaware of the words we use to discus reality of things around 
us, so too we are usually unaware of the abstracted intentions in our knowledge of 
things in the world.  Thus Augustine likens such abstracted forms or images as ‘signs’ 
and as ‘Verbum Mentis’, which Brentano draws our attention to in the 1874 note 
accompanying that passage in PES, p. 88 n. Abstracted forms of sense, then, are 
transparent ‘instruments’ used in the knowing process of which we are directly 
unaware, as Brentano correctly maintains in his 1866 The Psychology of Aristotle (98, and 
ff.). This is why the Scholastics considered such abstracted forms of sense as ‘blind 
instruments’ used in that process. Brentano completely deviates from this position in
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speaking’ (DP, p. 29, my emphasis), through an intentional union, and not 
through a real union. Marras puts this point well for the Scholastics, when 
he notes and stresses, 
To say an object exists formally (immaterially, intentionally, etc.) in the subject 
[Marras means in the knowing subject engaged in an act of sense knowledge 
of a physical thing in the external world, as is evident from the context] is 
merely to say that the form of the object exists in the subject (‘Lapis autem non 
est in anima, sed forma lapidis’). … As the Scholastics put it, the form of the 
object exists in the subject as an attribute or modification of the subject (sicut 
accidens in subiecto). … And, as any student of scholastic philosophy well knows, 
the form thus exemplified—the species—is not that which is (directly) known [id 
quod cognoscitur], but that by means of which the extramental object is known [id 
quo cognoscitur]. 91 
In Scholastic epistemology, therefore, the intentional in-dwelling of the 
abstracted form of sense in the soul of the knower is just one instance where 
an ‘intentional union’ takes place in the world between one entity (the 
knower’s soul) and another entity (the physical thing in the world which 
the knower comes to know) as Stein, Hayen and De Boer have all 
remarked, and as Brentano himself clearly reminds his reader of PES, in 
the extended footnote appended to the passage in 1874 upon its re- 
introduction. 92 
If we turn to Brentano’s actual 1874 passage in PES, however, we 
find Brentano declaring here that ‘the intentional inexistence of an object’ 
is exclusively a defining feature of the psychical-act experiences of a 
mentally active subject. Such is not the case in Scholasticism. The 
intentional presence of the sun in daylight is not a ‘psychical 
phenomenon’ for the Scholastics, neither is the presence of the 
woodcutter in the axe used to fell the tree. In the 1874 passage, therefore, 
Brentano literally modifies the entire scope of the application of the 
PES (and in DP). Brentano still, however, maintains that intentional objects of outer 
sense perception (colours) are ‘signs’—something that Husserl was critical of, from a 
descriptive-psychological point of view, rather than simply as the intended object of 
the act of outer perceptual sense experience itself—but, for Brentano in PES and DP, 
they are not signs of physical things and their properties in the external world but of a 
theoretically constructed reality uncovered and determined via natural scientific 
interpretation (i.e. light rays or light particles). 
91 Marras, ‘Scholastic Roots of Brentano’s Conception of Intentionality’, p. 131. This, 
indeed, is a lucid account and an unequivocal defence of the Scholastic realist 
epistemological position; but this is not the philosophical position that Brentano actually 
holds in the 1874 passage. 
92 Cf. Hayen, L’Intentionnel dans la philosophie de St. Thomas, pp. 35–7
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Scholastic concept of intentional in-dwelling to designate one thing, and 
one thing only, namely, the kind of mind-dependent-existence that is 
characteristic of the immediate contents of the actual acts present in 
human consciousness. Brentano now regards ‘the intentional inexistence 
of an object’ as exclusively a property of ‘mental objects’ of one’s own 
actual acts of consciousness. Indeed, Brentano appears to have been so 
successful in his re-introduction, revaluation and reduction of the original 
Scholastic metaphysical concept of ‘(in)esse intentionale’ in PES (1874) to an 
exclusively descriptive-psychological principle designating the mode of 
being of the contents of a ‘mentally active subject’ that this is probably 
why many commentators today in the philosophy of mind believe, 
incorrectly, that this is what the original Scholastic concept means, or 
even part of what the original Scholastic concept means, namely, the 
mental indwelling of an object and its particular (and questionable) 
ontological status of mind-dependent-existence in consciousness. 93 
Nevertheless, Brentano still concurs with the original Scholastic 
metaphysical meaning of intentional indwelling as denoting a distinct 
mode of being that is opposed to any real substantial mode of being 
(either inside the mind or outside of the mind). 94 And he agrees quite 
closely with Aristotle’s view that the abstracted forms of sense in acts of 
sense knowledge are dependent upon the activity of the intellectual part 
of the human soul (‘the mentally active subject’ for Brentano) for their 
93 Brentano’s rendering of the Scholastic thesis of intentional indwelling in the 1874 
passage would appear to have led William Lyons into his belief that this is ‘part of one 
well-known medieval account of intentionality [that] involved making a distinction 
between esse naturale (natural existence, such as that of a tree or a rabbit) and esse 
intentionale (intentional or mental existence, such as that of a thought or mental image) 
… ‘intentionale’ in the phrase ‘esse intentionale’ was derived from the Latin word intentio, 
which meant, roughly, ‘having an idea’ or ‘direction of attention in thought.’ 
Approaches to Intentionality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 1. What is being 
distinguished in the Scholastic metaphysical concepts of esse naturale and esse intentionale 
is not, as Lyons would suggest, a modern, post-Cartesian distinction of ‘nature’ and 
‘mind’ but two different modes of being-in e.g. a rabbit that jumps into the hollow of 
a tree stump is said to be really in the tree stump, in comparison to the flowing but 
incomplete presence of one real object in another real object such as, for instance, the 
intentional presence of sun in daylight, or of a user in an instrument used, or of the 
abstracted form of sense (‘having an idea’) in the soul of the knower.  Nevertheless, 
Brentano’s own modification of the Scholastic concept of esse intentionale in the 1874 
passage of PES to mean the mental indwelling of an object in consciousness and its 
peculiar ontological status of mind-dependent-existence did evoke much attention and 
criticisms from many quarters. 
94 Thus Brentano can abstract from the actual object as it exists outside of the mind 
and focus on the descriptive-psychological ‘content’ of any given psychical-act 
experience in his descriptive-psychological inventory.  Cf., PES , pp. 93–4
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existence, though Brentano no longer subscribes to Aristotle’s supporting 
theory of the active intellect. Part of the new meaning, however, that 
Brentano attributes to this intentional object of sense in the 1874 
passage—and one that is not found at all in Aristotle or in the Scholastics— 
is that this object is now to be regarded as the directly intended object of 
outer sense perception. 95 Because Brentano now regards all objects of the 
acts of consciousness univocally as the intended objects of those acts, it now 
follows for Brentano that all the immediate and direct objects of 
sensation, volition, cognition, judgement, love, hate, desire and so forth 
can be called ‘intentional objects’, something that is not possible in Scholastic 
philosophy but something that is not only possible but actually the case in 
all of Husserl’s writings. 
In Brentano’s new scheme of things, therefore, whether the 
intended object of a given psychical-act experience, such as for instance, 
that which is given to an actual act of outer perceptual-sense experience, 
is a real object existing in like manner outside of the mind, or not, this 
issue is to be ‘bracketed’, to use Husserl’s metaphor, in any descriptive- 
psychological investigation into the nature of psychical acts and their 
intended objects. From a descriptive-psychological perspective, therefore, 
by the ‘intentional inexistence of an object’ Brentano simply means the 
intended object of any actual psychical-act experience that arises for a 
mentally active subject. 96 All of this, as Husserl quite rightly points out, is 
95 What this means for the early Husserl, for whom the intentional object is the end 
term of perception also, is that we can abstract from the actual extra-mental existence 
of the ultimate real object of outer sense perception without losing anything in our 
descriptions of that intended object. This, ‘is the background of his [Husserl’s early 
descriptive-psychological] epochē’, (de Boer, The Development of Husserl’s Thought, pp. 
194–5). This descriptive-psychological epochē, that is already in operation in Brentano’s 
PES, must not to be confused with, nor identified as the transcendental- 
phenomenological epochē in Husserl’s celebrated transcendental reduction of Ideas I, i.e., 
the cancelling of an erroneous belief in the thesis of the natural standpoint. Nor 
should the transcendental reduction be confused with Husserl’s earlier elaboration of 
‘eidetic reduction’ and the process that is involved in ‘eidetic ideation’ in his Logical 
Investigations. Nor is ‘the Being-question’ (die Seinsfrage) that Heidegger endeavours to 
retrieve for phenomenology and phenomenological research, by any stretch of the 
imagination, a re-opening of the brackets set around the question of ‘being’ that 
occurs either in Husserlian descriptive-psychological analysis, eidetic ideation or 
transcendental reduction, manoeuvres that are characteristic of Husserl’s 
development. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, however, appears to fuse all of these in his 
often-quoted ‘Preface’ to The Phenomenology of Perception that has been, and continues to 
be, so influential among commentators and critics of Husserlian and Heideggerean 
twentieth century phenomenology. 
96 Thus, as de Boer points out, in PES ‘any inner relation between the intentional 
object and the ‘real’ object is eliminated.’ The Development of Husserl’s Thought, p. 192
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‘derived out of consciousness itself in immanent description’, and marks a 
major ‘transformation [by Brentano] of the Scholastic [metaphysical- 
epistemological] concept of Intentionality [intentional indwelling]’, 
though Husserl is oblivious of this ‘slight change’ made by Brentano to 
this Scholastic metaphysical-epistemological concept of intentionality. 97 All of this, 
nevertheless, as Husserl also realised, though much later in his own career 
(i.e. after his Logical Investigations (1900–1901), and before his move to 
transcendental idealism around 1907–1908), evades rather than addresses 
any epistemological viewpoints on either realism or idealism. 98 And yet, all 
of this still concurs with the way the Scholastics understood the 
abstracted form of sense, or intelligible species, as dependent for its 
existence on the activity of the intellectual part of the soul of the knower. 
This object, in its manner of being, must not be metaphysically confused with, 
nor identified to the actual mode of being of a real thing (res) existing outside of the 
mind, just as Brentano, following the Scholastics, stresses in the 1874 
passage. Interestingly, this scholastic distinction still continues to play a 
pivotal role in Husserl’s own celebrated reduction of the natural 
standpoint to the transcendental-phenomenological standpoint in Ideas I 
(1913) where the entire world of things that are given (known) through 
acts of outer perceptual-sense experience is (in)famously described by 
Husserl as having ‘only’ an ‘intentional’ mode of being ‘for a consciousness’ 
(i.e. as having only mind-dependent-existence for an individual’s actual 
consciousness) in opposition to the way the person, living in the natural 
standpoint, regards (naively and erroneously) the world, considered as the 
totality of things given to outer sense perception, as having real and actual 
existence in itself. 99 
Some Conclusions, and Some Remarks Towards a Critical Evaluation of Brentano’s 
Descriptive-Psychological Concept of the Intentionality of Consciousness 
A complicating matter in addressing Brentano’s adaptation of the 
Scholastic concept of intentionality into a root-concept of descriptive 
psychology is the fact that Brentano adapts the meanings of not one but 
two different concepts of intentionality that are traceable to the 
Scholastics, namely, the concept of the intentional act of the will and the 
epistemological-metaphysical concept of the abstracted form of sense (or 
intelligible species) residing intentionally in the soul of the knower. 
97 Husserl, Ideen III, 59, quoted by J.C. Morrison, ‘Husserl and Brentano on 
Intentionality’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 31 (1970), pp. 27–46, p. 27 
98 Cf. Th. de Boer, ‘The Meaning of Husserl’s Idealism in the Light of his 
Development’, trans. by H. Pietersma, Analecta Husserliana, 2 (1972), pp. 322–32 
99 Ideas, §§ 27–62 (§49)
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Brentano made major descriptive-psychological adjustments to both of 
these concepts, and so, he develops not one but two theses of 
intentionality, one concerning the object-relatedness of the acts of 
consciousness and the other concerning the mode of being that the object 
of which consciousness is a consciousness enjoys. Both of these theses, 
whilst bearing some family resemblance to their original birth certificates 
in Scholasticism, are entirely un-Scholastic concepts. Nevertheless, the 
two theses that Brentano develops are conceptually related, for, once the 
object of consciousness is viewed univocally as the directly intended 
object of a specific act of consciousness, as in Brentano’s first thesis, it 
follows analytically from this descriptive-psychological claim that there is 
an act hidden but nonetheless present that intends that object. Hence the 
need, in Brentano’s and Husserl’s definition of descriptive-psychological 
and phenomenological analysis, for  ‘research’, and for ‘inner reflection’, and 
for ‘scientific investigation’ into the way psychical-act experiences, as thus 
construed on this intentional model of consciousness, present their 
objects in the elucidation of this intentional model of consciousness. 100 
Brentano’s first thesis on the intentional object of consciousness as 
the directly intended object of consciousness (PES), therefore, implies the 
second thesis concerning the immanent relation of an act to that object 
(DP), a feature that Brentano had in point of fact spotted about our 
psychical-act experiences in PES but which he only began to refer to and 
emphasize as an ‘intentional relation’ after his 1874 publication, and in his 
lectures on ‘descriptive psychology’ delivered at the University of Vienna 
from the mid 1880s to the early 1890s. 101 Indeed, this second thesis of 
intentionality became so well known that we find Heidegger instructing 
his students in his 1927 Summer lecture course at Marburg University on 
The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, that, 
Comportments have the structure of directing-oneself-toward, of being- 
directed-toward. Annexing a term from Scholasticism, phenomenology calls 
100 All of this, of course, will be lost if the intentionality of the acts of consciousness is 
interpreted in terms of ‘openness’, ‘no-thingness’, ‘negativity’, or ‘the awareness of the 
There of Being, in which I find myself implicated as a being in Being’ (‘Dasein’ in the 
way Heidegger understands that term) that is disclosable methodologically, in Heidegger’s 
view, only from within the mood of Angst. 
101 From about the mid-1880s to 1905, Brentano held two theses of intentionality, one 
concerning the immanence of objects in consciousness and the other depicting the 
directedness of the acts of consciousness towards those immanent objects. After 
1905, he abandons the thesis of the immanence of objects in consciousness but 
retains the directedness of the activity of the acts of consciousness as his thesis.
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this structure intentionality. Scholasticism speaks of the intentio of the will, of 
voluntas; it speaks of intention only in reference to the will.  It is far from 
assigning intention also to the remaining comportments of the subject or 
indeed from grasping the sense of this structure at all fundamentally. 
Consequently, it is a historical error as well as a substantive error to say, as is 
most frequently today, that the doctrine of intentionality is Scholastic. … 
Nevertheless, Scholasticism does not know the doctrine of intentionality. In 
contrast, to be sure, Franz Brentano in his Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt 
(1874), under the strong influence of Scholasticism, and especially of Thomas 
and Suarez, gave sharper emphasis to intentionality and said that the sum total 
of all psychical experiences could be and had to be classified with regard to 
this structure, the manner of directing oneself towards something. … Brentano 
influenced Husserl, who for the first time elucidated the nature of intentionality in the 
Logical Investigations (1900–01) and carried this clarification further in Ideas (1913). 102 
While it is philosophically true that Brentano emphasised the descriptive- 
psychological tenet that all psychical-act experiences could be and had to 
be arranged following ‘the ways in which’ (PES, pp. 197–198, my emphasis) 
such acts directed themselves towards their objects, the term that 
Brentano actually annexes from Scholasticism in PES is not the term of 
‘intentio voluntatis’ but (a version of) the Scholastic concept of the 
abstracted form existing intentionally in the intellectual part of the 
knower’s soul. 103 Heidegger’s reading of Brentano’s later (second) thesis 
of intentionality (‘Brentano II’) back into the first thesis of intentionality 
(‘Brentano I’)—the only thesis of intentionality that is actually elaborated in 
PES (1874)—invariably overlooks not only the extensive re-working that 
the original Scholastic metaphysical concept of intentional indwelling 
(inesse intentionale) had undergone in PES but also the philosophical 
implications of that re-working for Husserl’s later development of both of 
Brentano’s theses of the intentional object as the intended object of 
consciousness and the intentional act as the object-relatedness of 
consciousness to its object. Notwithstanding Husserl’s well-known 
descriptive-psychological objections to Brentano’s (phenomenologically 
unjustifiable) view of the intended object of perception as a sign of 
something other than itself (i.e. of  the effects of stimuli, the theoretically 
102 Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. by A. Hofstader 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 58 
103 The actual terminology of ‘intentionale Inexistenz’, employed by Brentano in the 1874 
passage, does not occur in Scholasticism (e.g. ‘intentionale inexistentia’), however, as 
Hedwig’s researches have shown. Nevertheless, Brentano’s allusions in PES are 
clearly to the particular metaphysical concept of ‘intentional indwelling’ ([in]esse 
intentionale) as applied specifically in Scholastic theory of knowledge.
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constructed thing of physics) and Husserl’s objection to Brentano’s 
understanding of ‘physical phenomena’ as ‘immanent sense data’ (e.g., as 
‘reds’ rather than as the red of the rose or as ‘sounds’ rather than as the 
song of the singer, i.e. as sensations actively interpreted through 
objectivating acts), 104 Husserl advances and elucidates both theses of 
intentionality that Brentano elaborated. Taking these two theses together, 
the way in which a psychical-act experience intends its object becomes the 
root-concept of Brentano’s idea of descriptive psychology, for, it is not 
what or that such acts intend their objects that is the focus of attention in 
this new science but the way in which such acts intend their objects that 
must guide, in principle, any determination and classification of ‘mental 
phenomena in general’. What this revaluation of the Scholastic concept of 
intentionality into a root-concept of descriptive psychology announces, 
nevertheless, as Husserl also well grasped, is a new way of looking at 
human consciousness where the experiencing subject, understood in a 
post-Kantian fashion, and its ‘understanding of Being’ (Seinsverständnis)— 
to borrow Heidegger’s phrase—is taken as the primary reality for 
philosophic investigation. 105 
104 ‘I hear a barrel organ—the tones sensed are interpreted as those of a barrel organ’ 
(Husserl, Logical Investigations, p. 860). ‘I do not see colour sensations but coloured 
things; I do not hear sound sensations but the song of the singer’ (ibid., p. 569). 
Husserl’s view on the sense-bestowing (Sinngebung) function of the intentional activity 
of consciousness in the constitution of the meaning of objects presented via acts of 
outer perceptual-sense experience, however, is Husserl’s theory, and not Brentano’s, and 
it is a theory which Husserl derives from his view of the way in which consciousness 
animates and interprets the meaning of a word (‘marks’ on a page) and which he 
transposes onto his analysis and understanding of the meaning of perception. Cf. De 
Boer, The Development of Husserl’s Thought, p. 163, and Moran, Edmund Husserl: Founder of 
Phenomenology, p. 128. Dilthey, as was well known at the time, was highly critical of just 
such a theory because it is based upon an unphenomenological understanding of the 
experience of language (as Dilthey argues against Husserl). 
105 Heidegger, alongside many others, was critical of the phenomenologically 
unjustifiable Cartesian-dualistic metaphysical views of human subjectivity 
underpinning Brentano and Husserl’s conceptualisation of the intentionality of 
consciousness and ‘the understanding of Being’ that this at once makes possible and at 
once excludes within the manner of ‘inner reflection’ practiced in Cartesian-Lockean- 
Humean ‘psycho-analytic’ fashion. Rejecting a Cartesian metaphysical view of 
consciousness underpinning the tenet of the intentionality of consciousness is one 
thing, but leaving the entire concept of human consciousness—such as is done in 
Heidegger’s own conceptualization of ‘Dasein’ (as he understands that term) and the 
‘understanding of Being’ that is sent to Dasein (as Heidegger configures that 
sending)—is quite another thing, and one that is possibly tantamount to throwing the 
baby out with the bath water. Cf. Frederick Olafson, Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).
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It is not that surprising, therefore, that Brentano’s new concept and 
understanding of the intentionality of consciousness cannot be readily 
deployed or satisfactorily refined to resolve substantive philosophical 
problems noted with the Cartesian-Kantian separation of human 
consciousness and the human body in human subjectivity precisely 
because it is premised on that very assumption in the first place. 106 This 
metaphysical dualistic assumption of a lucid mind and an opaque body in 
human subjectivity underwrites Brentano’s methodological thematization of 
human consciousness as such in the elaboration of his new science of 
descriptive psychology. Likewise, it is not that surprising that Brentano’s 
new concept of the intentionality of consciousness cannot be used to 
address many substantive philosophical problems concerning our 
‘understanding of Being’ that even Heidegger acknowledges extends not 
only to the external world and to one’s self but also to one’s own fellow 
human being—of whom scant treatment, however, can be found in 
Heidegger’s own work—given the paucity of the choice between ‘the 
inner perception of our own psychical phenomena’ and ‘the outer 
perceptual-sense experience of physical phenomena (however 
appropriately the latter are phenomenologically described)’ as the only 
two founded-modes of perception that are available methodologically to 
Brentano (and to the early Husserl) for the purposes of clarifying the 
origin of the meaning of our ‘understanding of Being’. 107 And the 
106 Once this dualistic assumption is relinquished, and with it any philosophical 
investigation into ‘consciousness as such’—i.e. Brentanean and Husserlian 
phenomenological readings debarred—the only remaining option for ‘an important 
strand of research in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind’, as Bartok remarks, 
would be to continue the ‘search for an adequate analysis or theory of intentionality 
… that succeeds in demonstrating its reducibility to the purely physical or, failing this, 
its outright eliminability’, ‘Brentano’s Intentionality Thesis’, p. 438. Success here, 
however, would corroborate Maurice Nathanson’s prediction that, ‘[T]he 
naturalisation of consciousness is the death of consciousness’ (‘The Empirical and 
Transcendental Ego’, in For Roman Ingarden: Nine Essays in Phenomenology, ed. by A-T. 
Tymieniecka (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), pp. 42–53, p. 53. There are other 
approaches and trends in philosophical analysis that come from outside the analytic 
and phenomenological traditions associated with Brentano and Husserl that could be 
profitably deployed in the search for an adequate analysis or theory of intentionality, 
which would not necessarily impale themselves on one of the horns of the dilemma of 
its reducibility or its eliminability noted by Bartok. 
107 Brentano does remark in PES that ‘the relation of one human being to another, as 
far as their inner life is concerned, is in no way comparable to that which exists 
between two inorganic individuals of the same species, e.g., between two drops of 
water’ p. 36. Thus Brentano subscribes to some form of irreducibility or, at least, 
incomparability of our mental life to at least a certain level of physical reality. 
Analysing this particular relation of one human being’s inner life to a fellow human
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inclusion of universal objects (e.g. colour) about which we can and do 
make eternally true a priori judgements (e.g. colour implies extension), that 
are given to eidetic ideation or intuition ‘in their bodily reality so to speak’, 
which Husserl famously expounds in his advancement of a descriptive- 
eidetic-psychological method in the ‘principle of all principles’ (Ideas §24) 
can fare, in principle, no better either in addressing these issues. 108 If the 
descriptive method instigated by Brentano and advanced by Husserl of 
reflecting upon one’s own actual intentional consciousness cannot 
seriously address all of these problems, then such problems are not, 
strictly speaking, basic problems of that method or in that science but an 
undesirable state of affairs for that method and with that science. 109 Those 
who recognised this undesirable state of affairs as a methodological impasse to 
genuine phenomenological research into human consciousness and into 
what human consciousness is a consciousness of would have one of two 
options left open to take.  They would have to either (1) find a different 
method for phenomenological thinking to the kind that Husserl, following 
Brentano, practiced in their method of ‘inner perception’ and ‘inner 
reflection’ on intentional consciousness, or (2) incorporate alternative 
being’s inner life, however, is methodologically excluded in the science of descriptive 
psychology, as Brentano conceives of it, because descriptive psychology is based on 
‘inner perception’ of one’s own actual psychical-act experiences and their intentional 
objects, if they exist, whilst relying on the outer perceptual-sense experience of 
‘physical phenomena’ as a possible means of approach would be a case in point of 
comparing the incomparable. 
108 The primary analogate for Husserl here is the givenness for perception and not the 
bodily presence of one’s fellow human being. Lévinas departs completely from any 
such founded mode of perception as the legitimate phenomenal basis to approach the 
otherness of the other that we do encounter ‘face to face’ via dialogue, for, even when 
we are talking to another person about that person herself the otherness of the other 
discussed is more than that and stands behind that. That Husserl can regard  ‘Colour’ as 
an universal object that is given in its ‘living bodily reality’ (in seiner leibhaften 
Wirklichkeit), ‘present in the flesh’, ‘in propria persona’ to (eidetic) perception should be 
enough to alert commentators to the dominance of perception—and not the full 
presence of the living body of a fellow human being—in the analogy used here by 
Husserl and  in Husserl’s thought. Cf., however, Moran, Edmund Husserl: The Founder of 
Phenomenology, p. 266, n.37. 
109 Towards the end of his survey on ‘the problem of empathy’ in Husserl and in some 
of his contemporaries, Moran concludes that Husserl, ‘in discussing the experience of 
one’s own body, … invokes concepts of ‘innerness’ or ‘interiority’, ‘inner perception’ 
or ‘inner sensation’, and the whole sphere of owness (Eigenheitssphäre), all of which call 
out for clarification, and perhaps involve more problems than they solve.’ D. Moran, 
‘The Problem of Empathy: Lipps, Scheler, Husserl and Stein’, in Amor amicitiae: On the 
Love that is Friendship: Essays in Medieval Thought and Beyond in Honour of the Rev. Professor 
James McEvoy, ed. by Thomas A.F. Kelly and Philipp W. Rosemann (Leuven; Paris; 
Dudley, MA: Peeters, 2004), pp. 269–312, p. 311
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methods outside of Brentanean-Husserlian descriptive-methodological 
confines into their own manner and practice of phenomenological 
philosophising (such as, for instance, Heidegger did, by appropriating and 
adapting aspects of Dilthey’s hermeneutic method of ‘descriptive psychology’ 
in an effort to produce his own version of ‘descriptive phenomenology’ 
as ‘hermeneutic phenomenology’, famously announced and declared in 
the Introduction to Sein und Zeit (1927)—with Husserl’s (and Brentano’s) 
definition of the concept of ‘descriptive psychology’ accordingly ‘losing out 
in the competition’ (Besiegtwerden im Wettstreit, DP, p. 7), if I may borrow 
Brentano’s phrase). 110 Either way, Husserl’s idea of one method for 
phenomenology and for phenomenological research (für phänomenologische 
Forschung) into the intentionality of consciousness and its objectivities 
would have to be relinquished. Either way, the issue at stake (die Sache 
selbst), nevertheless, remains the same, i.e., the better way to approach and 
to investigate the intentionality of human consciousness and its 
objectivities: ‘Brentano’s thesis’. 
110 Whether Heidegger really understood the cut and thrust of Brentanean-Husserlian 
methodological concerns for science and research into the intentionality of the acts of 
human consciousness and their objectivities, and whether Heidegger was fully aware 
of the impasse to where both Brentano and Husserl’s respective methods of 
descriptive psychology and descriptive-eidetic psychology (and Husserl’s later method 
of transcendental reduction) led, Heidegger’s appropriation and integration of aspects 
of central tenets of Dilthey’s hermeneutic method of ‘descriptive psychology’ into his own 
version of ‘descriptive phenomenology’ as ‘hermeneutic phenomenology’ in Sein und 
Zeit (1927) ensured that Husserl could not be regarded today, either philosophically or 
historically, as the only founder of twentieth-century phenomenology. But that is the 
subject-matter of another debate, and of another much disputed case among 
commentators and critics concerning the originality of philosophical ideas in the 
history of twentieth-century phenomenology and phenomenological research.
